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ARTICLES

RISING TOGETHER: CLARIFYING THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
MARKETING CLAIM REGULATORY LANDSCAPE SO THAT DEVELOPING
COUNTRY EXPORTERS MAY MORE EFFECTIVELY MARKET THEIR
ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE PRODUCTS

Jeffrey J. Minneti*
INTRODUCTION
In the evolving story of environmental marketing claim regulation,
state actors no longer have center stage. Perhaps they never have. Instead,
non-state actors ranging from individual firms to inter-industry professional
standardizing bodies now play leading roles. Regulation of environmental
marketing claims generally takes the form of standardization and certification
schemes for voluntary eco-labels. As of 2011, there are over 400 eco-labels
worldwide. 1 A 2009 survey of 340 eco-labels in forty-two countries received
responses from just over 100 labels. 2 The responses provided a composite
view of eco-label organizations. Most are non-profits (58%); a few are
* Jeffrey J. Minneti, Professor of Legal Skills and Director of Academic Success, Stetson
University College of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges Stetson for its generous
financial support of this piece.
1
See ECOLABEL INDEX, http://www.ecolabelindex.com (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
Ecolabel Index has created a directory of eco-labels; it currently tracks over 400 labels in more
than 200 countries and twenty-five industry sectors. See id.
2
See WORLD RES. INST. & BIG ROOM INC., GLOBAL ECOLABEL MONITOR 2010 1–2
(2010), available at
http://www.ecolabelindex.com/downloads/Global_Ecolabel_Monitor2010.pdf (last visited
Nov. 05, 2011). World Resources Institute and Big Room, Inc. launched the survey in
November 2009 in an effort to increase the transparency of eco-labels and reduce confusion
among eco-labels, making it easier for institutional buyers to compare and contrast eco-labels.
See id. at 4.
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government entities (8%); and some are for-profit institutions (18%). 3 92% of
the respondents require certification before issuing a label. Of those, 64%
require third-party certification. 4 Fewer than half (46%) have measured the
environmental or social impact of their labeling program; 21% plan to do so. 5
Most eco-labelers (88%) make public who or what they have certified, and
most (87%) make their certification criteria public. 6 Many (47%) are currently
developing new standards. 7 Non-profit eco-labelers tended to use “more
rigorous” processes for standard development and conformity assessment. 8
Interestingly, fewer than 30% of eco-labelers recognize or are recognized by
other eco-labelers. 9
In 2010, the International Social and Environmental Accreditation and
Labeling (ISEAL) Alliance conducted a study to determine trends among 100
standard users in business, government, and NGOs. 10 The study revealed that
standards are widely used and accomplish a variety of purposes, including
increasing firm operational efficiency, marketing, and assessing and improving
sustainability practices. 11 Trust in standards and their promotion in the market
depend on credible standard verification, multi-stakeholder standard-setting,
and good standard system governance. 12 The respondents’ frustrations
included the lack of effectiveness of individual standards systems and the
complexity and overlap among various standards systems. 13
3

See id. at 2. Respondents were largely from Europe (fifty-one respondents) and North
America (forty-nine respondents). See id. at 7.
4
See id. at 10. The length of time from first applying for an eco-label to the eco-label
award varied greatly among respondents; however, 74% require from two weeks to six months
to award an eco-label. See id.
5
See id. at 12. 33% of respondents have not monitored and have no plan to monitor the
impact of their standards. See id.
6
See id. at 11. 62% of respondents make their eco-labels available worldwide. See id.
7
See id. at 12. When asked what would help improve “the overall effectiveness of your
eco-label program,” most claimed additional resources, better marketing, and consumer
awareness of their programs. See id. at 13. Very few claimed that differentiation between
good and bad standards (three respondents) or the harmonization of standards (three
respondents) would improve their effectiveness. See id.
8
See id. at 2.
9
See id. at 14.
10
See ISEAL ALLIANCE, THE ISEAL 100, 3 (2011), available at
http://www.isealalliance.org/sites/default/files/ISEAL100_web.pdf (last visited Nov. 23,
2011). Respondents included eighty “thought leaders” in business and twenty among
governments and NGOs. Id. The respondents were drawn from a database of leaders that
ISEAL generated in light of its industry contacts and knowledge of the industry. See id. at 6.
Respondents were from seventeen countries, but the vast majority was from the United
Kingdom (42%), continental Europe (34%), and the United States (17%). See id.
11
See id. at 3. 78% of corporate respondents included operational efficiency among the
“main benefits” of standards, 60% included communications and marketing, and 56% included
sustainable performance. See id. at 11.
12
See id. at 3.
13
The most common frustration (31% of respondents) was the “sheer number of standards
in operation.” Id. at 15. Office Depot was quoted as stating: “Each standard setter is very tied
to its own approach and methodology. If they organised themselves as a group and improved

2

3

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW

2011

The effectiveness of environmental marketing claim regulation and
voluntary eco-label schemes has been the subject of much debate. 14
their business model, interest would escalate dramatically. They are all protecting their tiny
slice of the pie, but the pie could be much bigger [sic].” Id. Interestingly, half of the
respondents rejected the idea of a “catch-all” eco-label, preferring instead that the existing
standards systems harmonize. See id. at 3. Responding businesses, on average, used four
different standard systems for their operations; 73% of the respondents stated they would
consider using more standards systems in the future. See id.
14
See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Eco-labeling: Actual Effects of
Selected Programmes, at 5–8, OCDE/GD(97)105 (May 30, 1997) (noting that the market
impact of eco-labels is difficult to assess, given that the information is often confidential, but
that anecdotal evidence suggests that eco-labels increase product sales; noting that hard
evidence of trade effects of eco-labels has not been found, but the potential for trade concerns
arises when eco-label criteria include production-related criteria that reflect developed country
preferences that are difficult for developing countries to satisfy; and stating that the
environmental benefits of eco-labeling will arise when “a balance is reached between the
number of eco-labeled products and the stringency of the criteria”); DIRK SCHEER, ET AL.,
“ENABLING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO SEIZE ECO-LABEL OPPORTUNITIES,” PROJECT
BACKGROUND PAPER 10 (2008) (noting that there is a “general lack” of empirical data on the
effectiveness of eco-label schemes; however, economic forecasters predict that with sufficient
market penetration, the labels may result in “considerable environmental benefits”); OECD
COMM. FOR FISHERIES & UNITED NATIONS [U.N.] FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. [FAO] FISHERIES &
AQUACULTURE DEP’T, ROUND TABLE ON ECO-LABELLING AND CERTIFICATION IN THE
FISHERIES SECTOR 10 (2009) (noting that eco-labels and certification “have a positive role to
play in incentivising improved fisheries management”); Jeffrey J. Minneti, Is It Too Easy
Being Green? A Behavioral Economics Approach to Determining Whether to Regulate
Environmental Marketing Claims, 55 LOY. L. REV. 653, 691 (2009) (finding that regulation of
environmental marketing claims is appropriate because, absent regulation, the market alone is
unable to drive false claims from products). But see THOMAS LIEBI, MONITORING ECOLABELS: YOU CAN HAVE TOO MUCH OF A GOOD THING 3, 4, 17–18 (2002) (noting that profitmaximizing firms prefer to offer products with low environmental benefits but market the
goods as environmentally responsible and charge a high price for the goods; consumers, aware
of this preference, decide not to choose the high-priced, low-quality goods; regulation acts to
keep firms from cheating and restores consumer trust in firms’ claims; however, the level of
monitoring inherent in the regulation increases costs and hence prices, without increasing the
actual environmental benefits of the products, resulting in a price for the goods above the
equilibrium point and, thus, deadweight loss); Peter E. Robertson, Global Resources and Ecolabels: A Neutrality Result, 15 REV. INT’L ECON. 735, 740 (2007) (arguing that where one
country adopts the eco-label scheme of a second country, consumers in the second country
may free ride on the environmentally responsible purchases of the first country’s consumers by
decreasing their own environmentally responsible purchases, resulting in no net reduction in
environmental damage); Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline, Is a Consumer’s Green Awareness
Increase Always Good for the Environment? 18–19 (June 27, 2011) (preliminary manuscript)
(arguing that increasing consumer awareness of a product’s environmental benefits and
willingness to pay for those benefits does not necessarily mean that producers will increase the
environmental benefits of a product; when consumer awareness of products’ environmental
attributes is non-uniform, “mass market” and even “niche posture” firms are likely to seek to
expand their market share by adopting lower levels of green quality). In 2000, the WTO’s
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) published a note that summarized three ecolabeling articles. See WTO Comm. on Trade & Env’t, Information Relevant to the
Consideration of the Market Access Effects of Eco-Labeling Schemes, WT/CTE/W150 (June
29, 2000). The note sought to provide the CTE with the tools it might need to draw
conclusions about eco-labeling trends and eco-labels’ potential trade impact. See id. The first
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Supporters of such schemes recognize that an eco-label scheme, standing
alone, is not likely to play a significant role in addressing environmental
problems; however, supporters argue that eco-labels can be an effective tool to
raise consumer awareness of environmentally responsible products and to
nudge consumers toward environmentally responsible purchases. 15 In recent
years, retailers and distributors have led efforts to promulgate eco-label
schemes; thus, no longer is consumer demand alone driving the market for ecolabeled products. 16 Instead, big-box retailers are now requiring that their
suppliers and manufacturers generate environmentally responsible products
and processes.
While the regulation of environmental marketing claims that the state
and non-state actors produce may, standing alone, be of good quality, 17 in this
era of ever-increasing globalization, a question emerges regarding whether the
existing eco-label schemes contemplate developing country interests. 18 In
piece noted that among North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries, although
concern for environmental protection was high, “environmental labeling appears to have
settled into a ‘niche’ or specialized market segment.” See id. at 1. Next, the CTE summarized
a study from Consumer International’s Office for Developed and Transition Economies. See
id. at 2–4. As noted in the preceding article, the study recognized the need for harmonization
of eco-label criteria, but it argued that eco-labels should not be seen as a “trade issue,” subject
to WTO regulation, because the WTO lacks a “‘credible environmental perspective.’” Id. at
3–4 (quoting OFFICE FOR DEVELOPED & TRANSITION ECONS., CONSUMERS INT’L, GREEN
LABELS 23 (1999)). Instead, the study recommended that a “credible international institution”
should take on the task. See id. at 4. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO),
the study asserted, would not be an appropriate organization, because it lacks technical
expertise in environmental issues and “‘its administrative structure makes it difficult for
environmental and consumer groups to participate throughout the entire course of standards
development.’” Id. (quoting OFFICE FOR DEVELOPED & TRANSITION ECONS., supra, at 21).
The study recommended a partial harmonization strategy, composed of bilateral agreements
among national eco-labeling schemes. See id. The third article considered the green
marketing trends in Germany. See id. (reviewing U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV.
[UNCTAD], PROFITING FROM GREEN CONSUMERISM IN GERMANY (1999)). It argued that
consumer interest in green products was likely to grow, and consequently, developing
countries should “think of proactive ways in which to adapt their exports to the environmental
requirements of the German market.” Id. To assist in that process, the article suggested that
developing and developed countries participate in sector-specific bilateral workshops to
improve information flow. See id.
15
See SCHEER ET AL., supra note 14, at 11–12 (noting that when coupled with other
elements, including links between eco-labels and firm-level environmental management
systems, government procurement policies, and waste policy regulation, eco-labels may be an
effective environmental management tool).
16
See id. at 14 (including producers, consumers, distributors, government, and ecolabeling bodies as stakeholders in eco-label schemes). See also OECD COMM. FOR FISHERIES
& U.N. FAO FISHERIES & AQUACULTURE DEP’T, supra note 14, at 13 (noting that “retailers
and brand owners are now driving demand” for supplier compliance with eco-label schemes).
17
See Jeffrey J. Minneti, Relational Integrity Regulation: Nudging Consumers Toward
Products Bearing Valid Environmental Marketing Claims, 40 ENVTL. L. 1327 (2010) (noting
that the ISO’s environmental marketing claim standards meet or exceed relational integrity
criteria and, perhaps, exceed state actor standards).
18
See U.N. INDUS. DEV. ORG. [UNIDO], ROUND TABLE: SUSTAINABILITY STANDARDS IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: HURDLES OR OPPORTUNITIES? 7 (2009) (noting two concerns for
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general, developed countries are net importers; developing countries 19 are net
exporters.
If an environmental marketing claim criteria-setting body
promulgates environmental product standards or product certification schemes
without conferring with developing countries and considering their interests,
the body may produce standards and certification procedures that are beyond
the reach of exporters in developing countries. 20 If the developing country
exporters are not able to conform or prove conformity with the standards, the
exporters will not be able to participate in the product market. 21 Furthermore,
if multiple environmental marketing claim criteria-setting bodies prescribe
different standards and certification schemes for the same products without
conferring with one another or developing country exporters, the exporters will
face a range of standards and certification schemes and will likely spend
exceedingly scarce resources attempting to conform to a variety of schemes. 22
This Article squarely addresses these concerns through the following
steps. First, in Part I, the Article ranks environmental marketing claim criteriasetting bodies based on an evaluation of the extent to which the bodies
consider developing country interests in their schemes. The ranking indicates
that developing country state actors’ schemes, not surprisingly, most carefully
consider developing country interests in their work. At the other end of the
spectrum lie non-state actors, which least consider developing country interests
in their work. Part II describes the characteristics of state actors, the current
international legal framework that governs the entities’ schemes, and explains
developing countries arising from eco-label and certification schemes: national capacity
weakness in conformity assessment processes and developing countries often left “voiceless”
in the process of generating such schemes).
19
“Developing countries” refer to those countries listed as low- or middle-income
countries on the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Indicators (WDI). See WORLD
BANK, WDI 2011 xxiii (2011) [hereinafter WDI 2011], available at
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators/wdi-2011 (breaking
down the size of the world’s economy by country).
20
See Environmental Requirements and Market Access: Preventing “Green
Protectionism,” WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_req_e.htm (last
visited Oct. 2, 2011) (noting that the environmental standards that one country issues could
“cause unwarranted economic and social cost to others, particularly developing countries, by
hindering exports”).
21
See May A. Massoud et al., Environmental Management System (ISO 14001)
Certification in Developing Countries: Challenges and Implementation Strategies, 44 ENVTL.
SCI. & TECH. VIEWPOINT 1884, 1885 (2010) (noting that developing countries face a host of
challenges in generating environmental management systems, including “[l]ack of appropriate
infrastructure, unsound policies, ineffective environmental regulations as well as financial and
human resource constraints.”).
22
See, e.g., WTO Comm. on Trade & Env’t, Report of the Meeting Held on 29 September
2010, ¶ 45, WT/CTE/M/50 (Nov. 2, 2010) [hereinafter September 2010 Report] (quoting the
representative from Brazil who stated that “[o]verlapping standards, lack of harmonization and
lack of equivalence between schemes created trade obstacles”). Accord WTO Comm. on
Trade & Env’t, Report of the Meeting Held on 17 February 2010, ¶ 44, WT/CTE/M/49 (Apr.
7, 2010) [hereinafter February 2010 Report] (quoting the representatives from Colombia and
Argentina expressing their concerns regarding the proliferation of private standards and the
potential for the standards to become de facto requirements for market access).
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why the Article concludes that state actors provide the most consideration to
developing country interests. Part III focuses on non-state actors, again
providing characteristics of the bodies, the legal framework applicable to the
bodies’ work, and an explanation for why the Article concludes the bodies
provide the least consideration to developing country interests. In light of the
finding that consideration of developing country interests is especially lacking
among non-state actors’ schemes, Part IV discusses two clarifications to the
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT) that would incentivize non-state actors to incorporate developing
country interests into their schemes. 23 Arguably, the effect of the clarifications
may slow the development of environmental marketing standards and
certification schemes. However, by drawing developing countries into the
standards and certification development process, the clarifications will lead to
increased developing country exporter participation in eco-label schemes,
resulting in more widespread environmentally responsible manufacturing
processes and products.
For the purpose of this Article, environmental criteria-setting bodies are
those bodies that generate criteria for benchmarking environmental
performance. State actor environmental criteria-setting bodies operate as
organs of government at a national or local level. For example, in the United
States, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) both generate environmental criteria.
The FTC has
24
promulgated the Green Guides, and the EPA and FTC have joined to produce
the Energy Guide and Energy Star programs. 25 At the local level, states within
the United States also generate their own environmental standards. For
example, California state law prohibits “untruthful, deceptive, or misleading”
environmental marketing claims. 26 California’s public policy states that
environmental marketing claims should be supported with “competent and

23

In 1999, Atsuko Okubo observed that under then-existing WTO law, environmental
marketing claim schemes may become de facto trade barriers. See Atsuko Okubo,
Environmental Labeling Programs and the GATT/WTO Regime,
11 GEO. INT’L. ENVTL.
L. REV. 599, 600 (1999). The author recommended that the TBT should regulate all
environmental labeling and that the WTO should establish an international notification system
to provide members with notice of labeling schemes. See id. at 639–43.
24
See Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R. pt. 260 (2010)
[hereinafter Green Guides]. For a discussion of the Green Guides, see Minneti, supra note 14.
25
See 42 U.S.C. § 6294(g) (2006) (noting Federal Trade Commission (FTC) authority
within the Energy Star program); 42 U.S.C. § 6294a(b) (2006) (noting the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and Department of Energy’s (DOE) responsibilities in the Energy
Star program). For a discussion of the Energy Guide and Energy Star programs, see Minneti,
supra note 17.
26
See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17580.5 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 360 of 2011 Reg.
Sess. and Ch. 11, and 13–16 of 2011-2012 1st Ex. Sess.); IND. CODE § 24-5-17-2 (West,
Westlaw through 2011 First Regular Session) (prohibiting environmental marketing claims
that do not meet the criteria within the Indiana Code, FTC trade regulations or guides, or other
federal agency regulations that establish environmental marketing claim standards).
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reliable evidence” and that the claims should adhere to “uniform and
recognized standards.” 27
Non-state actor environmental criteria-setting bodies are those that
work above the governmental plane, setting environmental criteria on behalf of
specific firms, specific industries, or multiple industries. An example of a
firm-specific entity setting environmental criteria is Walmart, which is
generating a sustainability index that will apply to products sold in its stores. 28
In contrast, the Global Social Compliance Programme (GSCP) sets
environmental criteria on behalf of a specific industry, “buying companies.” 29
Inter-industry actors include professional environmental criteria-setting
organizations whose primary goal is to generate environmental criteria either
for sale, as in the case of the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO), 30 or for public distribution, as in the case of ISEAL Alliance. 31
Environmental criteria are criteria that define acceptable levels of
environmentally responsible behavior. The criteria range from technical
regulations, which are mandatory, to standards and guidelines, which are
voluntary. 32
In the context of environmental marketing claims, few
environmental criteria are mandatory. The closest example is the US
government’s Energy Guide program, which requires that covered products be
labeled, unless the products are intended for export. 33 Most environmental
marketing claim criteria are voluntary standards or guidelines. For example,
the European Union’s eco-label regulation invites firms to conform their
environmental practices to a set of standards and, upon doing so, allows the
firms to display the EU eco-label on their products. 34 Likewise, ISO has

27

See CAL. PUB. RES. § 42355 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 360 of 2011 Reg. Sess. and
Ch. 11, and 13–16 of 2011-2012 1st Ex. Sess.).
28
See Sustainability Index, WALMART, http://walmartstores.com/sustainability/9292.aspx
(last visited Oct. 15, 2011). Walmart has structured a three-step process leading up to its use
of a “simple tool” that will provide consumers with information about the environmental
impact of the products they purchase. See id. The steps in the process include having its
suppliers complete a sustainability assessment, generating a life-cycle analysis database, and
the release of the tool described above. See id. Currently Walmart is working through the first
two steps. See id.
29
See GLOBAL SOC. COMPLIANCE PROGRAMME, http://www.gscpnet.com (last visited Oct.
15, 2011).
30
See About, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, http://iso.org/about.htm (last visited
Oct. 15, 2011).
31
See About Us, ISEAL ALLIANCE, http://http://www.isealalliance.org/content/about (last
visited Oct. 15, 2011).
32
The WTO draws the same distinction in its Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT). See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Annex 1 ¶¶ 1–2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868
U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17tbt_e.htm (last visited Nov. 05, 2011).
33
See 42 U.S.C. § 6300 (2006).
34
See Regulation (EC) No. 66/2010 of 25 Nov. 2009, art. 12, 2010 O.J. (L 27). For a
discussion of the EU regulation, see Minneti, supra note 17.

7

8

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW

2011

promulgated a set of voluntary standards that firms can use to establish an ecolabel program. 35
I.

ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING CLAIM CRITERIA-SETTING BODIES’
CONSIDERATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY INTERESTS

A review of the extent to which the environmental criteria-setting
bodies consider developing countries’ interests in their criteria-setting systems
reveals a spectrum ranging from those that primarily consider, act on, and
advance developing countries’ interests to those that choose not to consider
developing countries’ interests in their criteria-setting systems. Figure 1
summarizes the spectrum.

Developing
Country
State Actors

Developed
Country
State Actors

National/
Regional
Environmental
CriteriaSetting Bodies

Inter-Industry Environmental
Criteria-Setting Bodies

Firm-Specific
Environmental
CriteriaSetting Bodies

Highest Consideration
Lowest Consideration
Figure 1: Spectrum of Environmental Marketing Claim Criteria-Setting
Bodies’ Consideration of Developing Country Interests in Their CriteriaSetting Schemes
Out of self-interest, developing country state actors, which, as detailed
below, include legislative and administrative agency actions, most strongly
consider developing country interests in shaping their environmental marketing
claim schemes. Acting in conformity with WTO trade law and/or international
law and norms, developed country state actors also strongly consider
developing country interests in their environmental marketing claim regulation,
though not as strongly as developing country actors. Non-state actor national
and regional environmental claim criteria-setting bodies generally operate in
partnership with government, industry, professional standardizing bodies, and
consumer groups. Those operating within developing countries also strongly
consider developing country interests. Given their makeup, however, their
concerns are generally not as focused on developing country interests as the
state actors mentioned above. Such bodies operating within developed
countries generally have even less concern for developing country interests.
As indicated by the broader space afforded them on the spectrum, interindustry criteria-setting bodies offer a wide range of consideration to
developing country interests. As detailed below, entities such as ISEAL
Alliance and ISO offer considerable deference to developing country interests.
35

See Voluntary Standards, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/search.htm?qt=14024&sort=rel&type=simple&published=on (last
visited Oct. 15, 2011). For a discussion of ISO eco-label standards, see Minneti, supra note 17.
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Groups such as the Green Business Network, however, provide little to no
concern for developing country interests in their schemes. Firm-specific
environmental marketing claim criteria-setting bodies generally offer the least
consideration of developing country schemes.
II.

STATE ACTOR ENVIRONMENTAL CRITERIA-SETTING BODIES
A.

Characteristics

State actors generally have the capacity to prescribe environmental
regulations, standards, or both because they act as agents of the state.
Generally, developing and developed countries have government agencies that
serve as national criteria-setting bodies and promote the countries’ interests in
the international criteria-setting arena. For example, Mexico’s Dirección
General de las Normas [General Bureau of Standards] acts within the country’s
Secretary of Economy to promote Mexico’s interests among international
criteria-setting bodies. 36 Senegal’s Association Sénégalaise de Normalisation
[Senegalese Association of Normalization] performs a similar function: in
addition to crafting national criteria, the agency promotes Senegal’s interests
regionally and internationally. 37 Likewise, the mission of Thailand’s Industrial
Standards Institute is to generate standards that are consistent with
international standards and promote its national standards, regionally and
internationally. 38 And the United States draws upon the work of the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI) 39 for its voluntary private sector
standards, in addition to agencies such as the FTC and EPA, noted above. The
agencies generally form partnerships with private businesses to formulate
policy and craft their criteria. 40 In addition, national criteria-setting bodies
participate in international standardization. For example, Mexico and Thailand
have member bodies on the ISO working committee charged with setting
environmental criteria; Senegal is an observing member. 41

36

See Normalización Internacional, SECRETARÍA DE ECONOMÍA,
http://www.economia.gob.mx/swb/es/economia/p_Normalizacion_Internacional (last visited
Oct. 21, 2011).
37
See Présentation, ASS’N SÉNÉGALAISE DE NORMALISATION [ASN],
http://www.asn.sn/presentation.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2011).
38
See THAILAND INDUS. STANDARDS INST., http://www.tisi.go.th (last visited Oct. 21,
2011).
39
See AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST. [ANSI], http://ansi.org (last visited Oct. 21, 2011).
40
See, e.g., Présentation, supra note 37 (noting that ASN has partnered with the private
sector to generate a uniform set of product standards).
41
See TC-207—Environmental Management, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION [ISO],
http://www.iso.org/iso/standards_development/technical_committees/list_of_iso_technical_co
mmittees/iso_technical_committee_participation.htm?commid=54808 (last visited Oct. 21,
2011).
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Legal Landscape Applicable to State Actor Environmental
Criteria-Setting Bodies

International trade law sets boundaries on countries’ national
environmental criteria-setting efforts and provides opportunities for developing
countries to advance and protect their interests. Developing countries that are
members of the WTO, such as Mexico, Thailand, and Senegal, must set such
criteria in keeping with the WTO’s Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
requirements. As detailed more fully below, the composition of the WTO, the
attention provided to developing countries during the Doha Round of WTO
negotiations, and the TBT’s express consideration of developing countries’
interests, have each created fora where developing countries can articulate,
protect, and promote their interests.
1.

WTO Membership

The WTO currently has 153 members. 42 Two-thirds of its members are
developing countries. 43 The WTO does not define “developing country.”
Instead, a member country declares itself developed or developing. 44 Other
members may challenge a member’s declaration of developed or developing. 45
The WTO provides preferential treatment for least developed countries
(LDCs). 46 It defines LDCs as those that appear on the United Nations (UN)
list of LDCs. 47 The UN applies the following criteria to determine whether a
country is an LDC:
• a low-income criterion, based on a three-year average estimate of the
gross national income (GNI) per capita (under $750 for inclusion,
above $900 for graduation);
• a human resource weakness criterion, involving a composite Human
Assets Index (HAI) based on indicators of: (a) nutrition; (b) health; (c)
education; and (d) adult literacy; and
• an economic vulnerability criterion, involving a composite Economic
Vulnerability Index (EVI) based on indicators of: (a) the instability of
agricultural production; (b) the instability of exports of goods and
services; (c) the economic importance of non-traditional activities
42

See Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited, Oct. 21, 2011).
Thirty additional “states or customs territories” are seeking accession to the WTO. See
Accessions, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acc_e.htm (last
visited Oct. 3, 2011).
43
See Developing Countries Overview, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/dev1_e.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2011).
44
See Development: Definition, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2011).
45
See id.
46
See Developing Countries Overview, supra note 43.
47
See Least Developed Countries [LDCs], WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2011).
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(share of manufacturing and modern services in GDP); (d) merchandise
export concentration; and (e) the handicap of economic smallness (as
measured through the population in logarithm); and the percentage of
population displaced by natural disasters. 48
Currently, thirty-two WTO members are classified as LDCs. 49
2.

Doha Round Negotiations

The WTO launched the Doha Round, its latest round of negotiations, at
the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001. 50
Participants adopted the Doha Ministerial Declaration. 51 Recognizing that
developing countries make up the majority of WTO membership, the
Declaration seeks to place developing countries’ “needs and interests at the
heart” of its work. 52 Participants “strongly reaffirmed” their commitment to
sustainable development. 53 Specifically, the ministers stated that they were
“convinced that the aims of upholding and safeguarding an open and nondiscriminatory multilateral trading system and acting for the protection of the
environment and the promotion of sustainable development can and must be
mutually supportive.” 54 The Doha Declaration Work Program includes two
paragraphs focused on trade and the environment. The first, paragraph 31,
states that the ministers agree to negotiate the relationship between existing
WTO rules and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), procedures for
information sharing between WTO committees and MEA Secretariats, and the
reduction or elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods
and services. 55 Paragraph 32 instructs the WTO Committee on Trade and the
Environment (CTE) to “give particular attention to” the effects of
environmental measures on developing and least developed countries and to
instances where “the elimination or reduction of trade restrictions or distortions
would benefit trade, the environment, and development.” 56 In addition, the
Committee must attend to “labelling requirements for environmental
purposes.” 57

48

See The Criteria for the Identification of the LDCs, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/ldc%20criteria.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2011).
49
See Accessions, supra note 42.
50
See The Doha Round, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm#development (last visited Oct. 21,
2011).
51
See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declaration],
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.pdf.
52
See id. ¶ 2.
53
See id. ¶ 1.
54
Id. ¶ 6.
55
See id. ¶ 31.
56
See id. ¶ 32(i).
57
See id. ¶ 32(iii).
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Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)

The WTO’s TBT provides a number of rights and obligations that
govern the process of generating regulations and standards. The TBT’s
Preamble sheds light on the purpose and goals for the TBT. 58 The TBT
recognizes the value of international standards and conformity assessments in
improving the efficiency of production and the conduct of international trade. 59
Specifically relevant to the issues discussed here, the TBT further recognizes
countries should be free to take “measures necessary to ensure the quality of
[their] exports,” the protection of the environment and the life or health of
animals and plant life, and the prevention of deceptive practices. 60 And the
TBT recognizes that international standards can contribute to the transfer of
technology from developed countries to developing countries but that
developing countries “may encounter special difficulties” as they formulate
and apply regulations, standards, and conformity assessments. 61 The TBT’s
purpose is to encourage the development of standards and conformity
assessments but also to ensure that regulations and standards, “including
packaging, marking and labelling requirements” and conformity assessment
measures, “do not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade.” 62
Countries may not apply measures that they develop to protect the environment
and plant and animal life in a manner that would result in “arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries” or a “disguised restriction on
international trade.” 63
a.

TBT Article 2

TBT article 2 discusses member countries’ national governments’
preparation, adoption, and application of technical regulations. 64 Given that
developing countries are typically exporters of goods that fall subject to
technical regulations, 65 article 2 provides protection from developed countries’
regulations that may create barriers to export. 66 For example, TBT members
must ensure that their technical regulations treat imported products “no less
favorab[ly]” than national origin products or products originating in any other
58

See TBT, supra note 32, at pmbl.
See id.
60
See id.
61
See id.
62
See id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at art. 2. TBT Annex 1 defines “central government body” as a “[c]entral
government, its ministries, and departments or anybody subject to the control of the central
government in respect of the activity in question.” Id. at Annex 1, ¶ 6.
65
TBT Annex 1 defines “technical regulation” as a mandatory restriction on “product
characteristics or their process and production methods, including applicable administrative
provisions” and product packaging and labeling requirements. See id. at Annex 1, ¶ 1.
66
See generally TBT, supra note 32, at art. 2.
59
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country. 67 Also, as noted above, members’ technical regulations must not
create “unnecessary obstacles to international trade.” 68 Article 2.2 further
states that members’ technical regulations “shall not be more trade-restrictive
than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective.” 69 Legitimate objectives
expressly include the protection of the environment and the prevention of
deceptive practices. 70 Thus, should a developed country generate an
environmental marketing claim regulation designed to protect the environment,
the regulation could restrict international trade—but no more than necessary to
fulfill the environmental objective. As noted above, the United States’ Energy
Guide is an environmental marketing claim regulation, but at least presently,
the regulation does not apply to exported goods. 71 Thus, it does not run afoul
of article 2.2.
The WTO promotes the use of international standards, perhaps to the
detriment of developing countries. 72 Specifically, when a member is crafting a
technical regulation and relevant international standards exist or will be
imminently completed, the member “shall use” the international standards
unless the international standards would be “ineffective or inappropriate” given
the member’s legitimate objective for the regulation. 73 The WTO’s Appellate
Body has defined “relevant” as a standard that is “‘bearing upon or relating to
the matter in hand; pertinent.’” 74 Although Annex 1 of the TBT’s Explanatory
Note to the definition of “standard” states that international standards are based
on consensus, the Appellate Body has held that even those standards not based
on consensus are considered “international standards” for the purposes of
article 2.4. 75 For developing countries, the Appellate Body’s decision is
significant because standards that are not the product of consensus may
disproportionately reflect the position of developed countries. Generally,
developed countries have greater resources to expend on standards
development. Thus, they are better equipped to play a more substantial role in
standards development without any obligation to consider or act on developing
countries’ interests. By requiring developing countries to use international
standards, the TBT may require a developing country to use a standard that
conflicts with its environmental agenda.
Should a developing country object to the use of an international
standard, it can argue that climate, geography, and “fundamental” technical
problems render use of the international standard “ineffective or inappropriate”
given the developing country’s “legitimate” objective for using its own
67

See id. at art. 2.1.
Id. at art. 2.2.
69
Id.
70
See id.
71
See Minneti, supra note 17, for a discussion of the Energy Guide and Energy Star
programs.
72
See TBT, supra note 32, at art. 2.4.
73
Id.
74
Id. at art. 2(B) (quoting Panel on EC-Sardines).
75
See id. ¶ 10 (citing Panel on EC-Sardines).
68
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standard. 76 “Ineffective” means “something that does not ‘hav[e] the function
of accomplishing,’ having a result, or ‘brought to bear.’” 77 “Inappropriate”
means “not ‘specifically suitable,’ ‘proper,’ or ‘fitting.’” 78 Distinguishing
ineffective from inappropriate, the Panel on EC-Sardines stated that “[t]he
question of effectiveness bears upon the results of the means employed,
whereas the question of appropriateness relates more to the nature of the
means employed.’” 79 “Legitimate” objectives are those referred to in article
2.2 and include protection of the environment and prevention of deceptive
practices. 80 Thus, a developing country could seek to fashion its own
environmental marketing claim regulation, even though there is a relevant
international standard, such as ISO 14024, as long as the developing country
can argue that the international standard does not achieve the result of
protecting its environment or preventing deceptive practices or that the
regulation is not specifically suitable to those aims. 81 On paper, the argument
exists; however, one wonders whether, given its limited resources, a
developing country would actually be able to craft an environmental marketing
claim regulation that differs from the international standard and still have the
capacity to defend the standard before the WTO.
The TBT provides additional pressure to accept international standards.
First, should a member prepare a technical regulation for one of the preceding
legitimate objectives, and the technical regulation “is in accordance with
relevant international standards,” the TBT will rebuttably presume the
regulation does not create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade. 82
Second, should a member prepare a regulation on a topic for which there is no
relevant international standard or the member’s regulation is not in accord with
relevant international standards, and the member’s standard “may have a
significant effect” on other members’ trade, the member must publish a notice
of the regulation, indicating the regulation’s objective and rationale. 83 Upon
request, the member shall provide copies of the regulation and identify how the
regulation deviates from international standards. 84 And the members must,
“[w]ithout discrimination,” allow other members to comment on the
regulation, discuss the other members’ comments, and take the comments and
results from the discussions into account in the preparation of the regulation. 85
To ensure that international standards reflect all members’ interests, the TBT
76

See id. at art. 2.4.
Id. at art. 2(B)(2) ¶ 20 (quoting Panel on EC-Sardines).
78
Id.
79
Id. (emphasis in original).
80
See id. ¶ 22.
81
The party claiming inconsistency with article 2.4—here, perhaps, a developed country
or a second developing country—bears the burden of proving that the regulation is inconsistent
with article 2.4. See id. ¶ 9.
82
See TBT, supra note 32, at art. 2.5.
83
See id. at art. 2.9
84
See id. at art. 2.9.3.
85
See id. at art. 2.9.4.
77
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requires that members play a “full part, within the limits of their resources” in
the preparation of international standards. 86
b.

TBT Article 4

Article 4 turns away from technical regulation and addresses members’
central governments’ preparation, adoption, and application of standards,
which is an area of great relevance to environmental marketing claims, given
that most environmental marketing claim regulatory systems have standards,
by nature. 87 The TBT defines “standards” as non-mandatory “rules, guidelines
or characteristics for products or related processes and production methods.” 88
Article 4 requires that members “ensure” that their central standardizing bodies
comply with the TBT’s Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption
and Application of Standards (Code of Good Practice). 89 Article 4 further
requires that members “take such reasonable measures available to them” to
ensure that local governments, non-state actors within their territories, and
regional standardizing bodies of which they or a body within their territory is a
member, each comply with the TBT Code of Good Practice. 90 Members’
obligation to ensure compliance with the Code of Good Practice applies even if
the standardizing body has not accepted the Code of Good Practice. 91
Members must acknowledge that standardizing bodies that comply with the
Code of Good Practice are complying with the TBT provisions. 92
Thus, if Senegal’s central or local governments sought to create a
voluntary eco-label scheme that set standards for environmental marketing
claims, the governmental agencies would need to comply with the TBT’s Code
of Good Practice. Moreover, if the eco-label is the product of a non-state actor
within the developing country’s borders, then the WTO member must use
reasonable measures to ensure that the non-state actor complies with the TBT’s
Code of Good Practice, even if the non-state actor itself has not accepted the
Code.
1.

The TBT’s Code of Good Practice

Like the TBT itself, the Code of Good Practice provides a set of rights
and obligations, many of which mirror those applied in the context of technical
regulations.
Any standardizing body, including central, local, or
nongovernmental bodies, within a TBT member’s territory may accept the
TBT’s Code of Good Practice. 93 Accepting or withdrawing bodies must notify
86

See id. at art. 2.6.
See id. at art. 4.1.
88
See id. at Annex 1, ¶ 2.
89
See id. at art. 4.1.
90
See id.
91
See id.
92
See id.
93
See id. at Annex 3. ¶ B.
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the
International
Organization
for
Standardization/International
Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC), indicating the standardizing body’s
name, address, and current and expected standardizing activities. 94
In the context of environmental marketing claims, relevant substantive
provisions include the following requirements for standardizing bodies: article
D requires that the environmental marketing claim scheme must treat “like
products” from other countries “no less favorabl[y]” than the scheme treats
products originating from the standardizing body’s home country. 95 This
requirement suggests that two like products would either receive or not receive
an eco-label, depending not on whether the product was manufactured
domestically or in a foreign nation but on whether the product satisfied the
eco-label criteria. Concern has arisen regarding how to define “like products.”
The issue is whether the likeness determination should exclusively consider
aspects of a product’s process or production methods (PPMs) that affect the
physical characteristics of the end product or whether it should also consider
PPMs that are not product related (NPR PPMs) and, thus, have no impact on
the physical characteristics of the end product. 96
For example, if a domestic tire manufacturer changes a chemical
component of his tires such that the resulting tire has different physical
characteristics from foreign-made but otherwise similar tires, the manufacturer
would have made a PPM change resulting in a new product. Because the
domestic and foreign products have different physical characteristics, they
would not be considered “like products,” requiring the same treatment under
the TBT. An eco-label scheme that provides a label only for products using
the new chemical would not run afoul of the TBT Code of Good Practice
because the scheme would not be treating like products differently.

94

See id. at Annex 3, ¶ C.
See id. at Annex 3, ¶ D.
96
See Erich Vranes, Climate Labelling and the WTO: The 2010 EU Ecolabelling
Programme as a Test Case under WTO Law, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW 2 (Christoph Herrmann & Jörg Philipp Terhechte eds., 2011). Professor
Vranes notes that WTO members and the academic community have debated whether the TBT
would apply to a state actor created voluntary eco-label scheme that draws upon NPR PPMs.
See id. at 7. The concern centers upon the fact that NPR PPMs utilize factors that are
disassociated with the end product, but the TBT is thought to cover only product-related
PPMs. Professor Vranes points out that in the context of discussing Article L of the Code of
Good Practice, the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade has stated that Article L
applies voluntary labeling requirements and its application is not dependent upon the kind of
information provided on the label. See id. (citing Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, First
Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade, G/TBT/5 ¶ 12 (Nov. 19, 1997)). Those who argue that the TBT should not
cover NPR PPM analysis, which include developing countries, assert that since the TBT does
not cover such schemes, the schemes are per se invalid. See id. In response, Professor Vranes
argues that the TBT does not permit or exclude measures; instead, it prescribes new
obligations, in addition to those under GATT. See id. Thus, the better argument for
developing countries is that the TBT applies to voluntary eco-label schemes that use NPR PPM
because the TBT provisions are essentially stricter than those under GATT. See id.
95
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NPR PPMs, however, are process and production methods that have no
impact on the physical characteristics of the end product, such that a change in
the processing—perhaps a more environmentally responsible process that uses
less energy—has no impact on the end product’s physical characteristics. 97
Foreign tires produced with the non-energy efficient process will look, feel,
and perform the same as the domestic tires with the new process, but the
domestic tire would be more environmentally responsible. Under an eco-label
scheme that considers NPR PPMs, such as the EU’s Eco-Label Regulation, 98
the foreign tire may not receive the eco-label, but the domestic tire would, even
though the physical characteristics of the tires are the same.
If the like-products provision of the TBT does not contemplate NPR
PPMs, awarding the eco-label to the domestic but not the foreign tire may run
afoul of Paragraph D of the TBT Code of Good Practice because the ecolabeling entity would be treating a foreign product less favorably than a
domestic “like product.” 99 Note that even if the eco-labeling entity is a nonstate criterion-setting body, issues may arise under the TBT because members
are directed to use reasonable means to ensure that non-state standardizing
bodies comply with the TBT Code of Good Practice. 100
Whether products that result from NPR PPM are “like products” under
the TBT is an open question. In the context of discussing whether the EU
Ecolabel Act, which uses NPR PPM, is consistent with the TBT, Professor
Erich Vranes argues that like products are those that have a “close competitive
relationship” and that whether such a relationship exists should be examined
from the consumers’ perspective. 101 Noting that consumers may perceive NPR
PPMs, such as the energy consumption involved with tire production, as a
factor that distinguishes two otherwise physically indistinguishable products,
the NPR PPM may make one product sufficiently unlike another to receive
different treatment under an eco-label scheme. 102 Such a result would be
consistent with the TBT because the eco-label scheme would not be treating
like products differently. 103 However, because likeness is considered from the
consumers’ perspective, which is not necessarily the perspective taken by an
97

See id. at 2.
For a discussion of the EU regulation, see Minneti, supra note 17.
99
See TBT, supra note 32, at Annex 3, ¶ D.
100
See id. at art. 4.1.
101
See Vranes, supra note 96.
102
See id. at 12.
103
Professor Vranes observes that a mere potential violation is not de facto discrimination.
See id. at 18–19. Instead, only if the facts show that the eco-label scheme disproportionately
favors domestic products over foreign products would the eco-label result in de facto
discrimination. See id. at 18–19. Should the eco-label scheme give rise to a violation under
the TBT, it would trigger the WTO’s Appellate Body that has confirmed that GATT article
XX, which provides a set of defenses to otherwise impermissible regulations, may justify the
eco-label scheme, and the scheme would likely satisfy the TBT because labeling is generally
thought to be a “rather non-restrictive means for pursing environmental goals.” See id. at 22,
24 (citing Andrew Green, Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO: How
Constraining are Trade Rules?, 8 J. INT’L ENVTL. L. 143, 186 (2005)).
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eco-label scheme, Professor Vranes notes that there is a “clear risk” that the
eco-label scheme will treat products that consumers perceive as like,
differently, resulting in a violation of the TBT. 104 Nothing in the Code of
Good Practice provides a justification for treating like products differently.
TBT article 12 grants “[s]pecial and [d]ifferential” treatment to
developing countries. 105 If an eco-labeling entity is operating within a
developing country, arguably it may assert that article 12 permits it to
discriminate against foreign like products. 106 Article 12.1 calls upon
developed country members to provide differential and “more favorable
treatment to developing country members.” 107 Specifically, developed country
members are to “take account of the special development, financial, and trade
needs of developing country members” when assessing developing country
members’ rights and obligations under the TBT. 108 In addition, article 12.8
permits the WTO’s Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade to grant
developing countries “specified, time-limited exceptions in whole or in part”
from TBT obligations. 109
In addition, even if the eco-labeling entity is not operating within a
developing country, Professor Vranes notes that the TBT Preamble
contemplates that departure from the TBT’s obligations may be justified if
done, among other reasons, for protection of the environment and if the
departure does not constitute “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.” 110
Moreover, noting that WTO provisions should be considered cumulatively,
Professor Vranes argues that the justifications provided in GATT article XX
may apply to the TBT. 111 Among those justifications is article XX(b), a
provision that permits measures that are necessary to protect human, animal, or
plant life and article XX(g), which permits measures that relate to the
exhaustion of natural resources as long as the measures are made effective with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption. 112 Such measures must
also satisfy the introductory clause of article XX, the chapeau, which
proscribes measures that are applied in a manner that results in “arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination.” 113 Professor Vranes concludes that the EU ecolabel scheme, which uses NPR PPMs, likely satisfies the TBT, either under the
TBT itself or under the GATT Article XX justifications. 114 Thus, a developing

104

See id. at 23, 25.
See TBT, supra note 32, at art. 12.
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See id. at arts. 12.1, 12.2, 12.8.
107
See id. at art. 12.1.
108
See id. at art. 12.2.
109
See id. at art. 12.8.
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Vranes, supra note 96, at 23; TBT, supra note 32, at pmbl.
111
See Vranes, supra note 96, at 23.
112
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) arts. XX(b), (g) available
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm (last visited Nov. 05, 2011).
113
Id. at art. XX.
114
See Vranes, supra note 96, at 25–26.
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country eco-label scheme that employs NPR PPMs would also likely satisfy
the TBT.
Article E provides that the eco-label standards must not be “prepared,
adopted, or applied” in a way that would create or have the effect of creating
“unnecessary obstacles to international trade.” 115 A voluntary eco-label
scheme that uses NPR PPMs may also violate article E for the same reasons it
might violate article D. The issue here becomes whether the eco-label scheme
is necessary to accomplish the standardizing body’s environmental goals.
Professor Vranes notes that generally, eco-labeling schemes are considered a
“suitable and comparatively rather non-restrictive means for pursuing
environmental goals.” 116
The environmental marketing claim scheme must use existing
international standards as a basis for the scheme, unless doing so would be
“ineffective or inappropriate,” due to fundamental climactic, geographic, or
technological problems. 117 The most prevalent international standards for
environmental marketing claims are ISO’s 14021, 14024, and 14040 series.
One component of the ISO standards presents a potential issue for developing
countries. The ISO eco-label scheme contemplates the use of life-cycle
analysis in setting criteria for eco-labels. Specifically, ISO 14024, which deals
with third-party environmental marketing claims, such as those a non-state
actor would generate, states that “[t]he objective of reducing environmental
impacts and not merely transferring impacts across media or stages of the
product’s life cycle is best served by considering the whole product life cycle
when setting product environmental criteria.” 118 The international standard
provides a list of life-cycle stages that a standardizing body should take into
account, including “extraction of resources, manufacturing, distribution, use,
and disposal.” 119 The standard requires that a standardizing body justify
“[a]ny departure” from a life-cycle approach or a “selective use of restricted
environmental issues.” 120
ISO’s use of life-cycle analysis raises two sets of issues. First, because
life-cycle analysis contemplates non-product related processes such as energy
inputs, life-cycle analysis is an NPR PPM. 121 Therefore, use of the ISO
standard draws in the preceding discussion of the TBT’s treatment of NPR
PPMs. Second, there is considerable disagreement regarding the utility of lifecycle analysis and confusion about defining the appropriate stages of the
analysis. As noted above in the discussion of the Doha Declaration Work
Program, the WTO’s CTE must “give particular attention” to “labelling
requirements for environmental purposes.” 122
115

TBT, supra note 32, at Annex 3, ¶ E.
Vranes, supra note 96, at 24.
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In the CTE’s April 2003 Report of the Meeting, the European
Communities proposed that the CTE discuss a voluntary eco-label based on
life-cycle analysis. 123 The European Communities’ discussion exposed
members’ views on life-cycle analysis. The representative from Malaysia
reportedly stated:
Voluntary eco-labelling schemes based on life-cycle
approach was a concept not well understood and its
practice was not universally accepted. These schemes had
not been determined to be the most effective or least costly
labelling schemes. System boundaries were not always
clear, processes were often ill-defined—especially when
they generated more than one product—and full
information on the choice of technology available and data
on environmental processes was also often incomplete or
inaccurate and could, therefore, lead to distortion of such
an assessment. Life-cycle analysis was still fraught with
subjectivity and many unknowns, and if widely applied
could provide avenues for misuse [sic]. 124
Representatives from Cuba, Brazil, Chile, and Indonesia voiced similar
concerns. 125
WTO members voiced similar concerns in September 2010 in
discussion regarding carbon footprint labels. 126 For example, Argentina
questioned the level of transparency provided to the development of carbonfootprint methodologies that considered life-cycle analysis, and Turkey argued
that NPR-PMM-based eco-label schemes were inconsistent with WTO rules,
given that the schemes could give rise to disguised protectionism. 127 In spite
of the representatives’ concerns, however, if a developing country sought to
create an eco-label scheme that did not utilize a life-cycle approach, or used a
limited form of life-cycle analysis, as long as the developing country justified
its reason for doing so, its scheme would be consistent with ISO 14024, the
international standard, and thus consistent with the TBT Code of Good
Practice. Moreover, the developing country’s justification for ISO 14024
purposes would likely also satisfy the exception in Code of Good Practice
paragraph F, because the developing country would likely argue that use of the
ISO 14024 would be ineffective or inappropriate due to fundamental climactic,
geographic, or technical issues. 128
123

See WTO Comm. on Trade & Env’t, Report of the Meeting Held on 29 April 2003,
WT/CTE/M/33, ¶ 37 (21 May 2003). Note that the European Communities’ proposal found
expression in the EU’s Ecolabel Act 66/2010.
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Id. ¶ 62.
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See id. ¶¶ 63, 64.
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See September 2010 Report, supra note 22, at 42, 43, 47–50.
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See id. ¶¶ 42, 50.
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Several other Code of Good Practice provisions have an impact on
developing countries’ ability to protect and advance their environmental
interests, though their roles are less significant than those above. Paragraph G
of the Code of Good Practice invites standardizing bodies to play as “full” a
role as possible in the work of international standardizing bodies so that
standards are harmonized. For developing countries, doing so is difficult due
to costs associated with traveling to and participating in meetings. 129
Moreover, developing country national standardizing bodies face a number of
challenges, including understaffed laboratories, obsolete equipment, and a lack
of infrastructure for essential data collection and processing. 130
The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
established a Consultative Task Force in 2004 to assist developing countries in
understanding key trends in environmental requirements applicable to exported
products. 131 Since its inception, the Task Force has hosted a number of
meetings, the latest in 2006, designed to build capacity and provide dialogue
and networking opportunities for state and non-state actors. 132 ISO has
established DEVCO, a policy committee charged with addressing developing
countries’ needs. 133 In addition to identifying developing countries’ needs and
suggesting ways to meet them, DEVCO monitors the implementation of ISO’s
Action Plan for developing countries. 134 The plan’s outputs focus on
increasing developing country participation in ISO standardizing activities,
building awareness of the function and utility of standards among developing
country stakeholders, increasing developing countries capacity to engage in
standards work, and educating youths on the relevance and importance of
international standards. 135
Several of the Code of Good Practice provisions promote the
harmonization of standards. For example, Paragraph G encourages all the
standardizing bodies within a member’s territory to participate in international
standardizing work through a single delegation that represents the members’
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See Md. Nazrul Islam, ISO 14001: Legal Challenges for Developing Countries, in
Environmental Law in Developing Countries 15, at 30 (2001), available at
http://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/EPLP-043.pdf.
130
See United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev. (UNCTAD) Secretariat,
Environmental Requirements and Market Access for Developing Countries, ¶ 22,
TD/(XI)/BP/1 (20 April 2004), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdxibpd1_en.pdf.
131
See Consultative Task Force on Environmental Requirements and Market Access for
Developing Countries, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. [UNCTAD],
http://www.unctad.org/trade_env/test1/projects/taskforce.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
132
See id.
133
See What is DEVCO?, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/what_is_devco (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
134
See id.
135
See INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO ACTION PLAN FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 2011-2015 (2010) [hereinafter ISO ACTION PLAN], available at
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_action_plan_developingcountries-2011-2015.pdf (last visited Nov.
05, 2011).
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standardizing bodies. 136 In addition, the Code of Good Practice calls upon
standardizing bodies within a member to avoid duplicating or overlapping the
work of other standardizing bodies and to seek to achieve national consensus
on their standards. 137 As long as developing countries play an equitable role in
the harmonization of standards, the process greatly benefits developing
countries because it reduces the number of standards that exporters must
satisfy.
Paragraph I provides that standardizing bodies shall, “[w]herever
appropriate,” specify product standards based on the products’ performance,
rather than on the products’ “design or descriptive characteristics.” 138
Arguably standards based on design or descriptive characteristics may include
eco-label standards that address NPR PPMs or life-cycle analysis because such
standards contemplate how products are designed and the products’
composition. Thus the paragraph may be read to discourage such standards.
However, research reveals no such interpretation of the phrase. Further, the
disclaimer “wherever appropriate” may be applicable—environmental
concerns may be an area where the preference against design or descriptive
based standards does not apply. This conclusion finds support in the TBT’s
expressed acknowledgement of the importance of environmental concerns. 139
The Code of Good Practice requires a significant amount of
transparency among standardizing bodies. Standardizing bodies must publish
their current work programs, including standards under development and
standards adopted, at least once every six months. 140 A standardizing body
must allow sixty days for interested parties within the body’s member state to
comment on any draft standard, unless the standard addresses an “urgent”
problem arising from safety, health, or environmental concerns. 141
Notification of the draft standard must indicate whether the draft deviates from
international standards. 142 Any interested party within a member’s territory
may request a copy of a draft standard, which the standardizing body must
promptly provide. 143 Standardizing bodies must take comments into account
as they develop draft standards. 144 If requested to do so, standardizing bodies
must reply to comments received from standardizing bodies that have accepted
the Code of Good Practice, and the reply must explain why the draft standard
deviates from the international standards, if it does so. 145 Once adopted, a
standard must be “promptly published.” 146 The dispute resolution provision of
136

See TBT, supra note 32, at Annex 3, ¶ G.
See id. at Annex 3, ¶ H.
138
Id. at Annex 3, ¶ I.
139
See TBT, supra note 32, at pmbl.
140
See id. at Annex 3, ¶ J.
141
See id. at Annex 3, ¶ L.
142
See id.
143
See id. at Annex 3, ¶ M.
144
See id. at Annex 3, ¶ N.
145
See id.
146
Id. at Annex 3, ¶ O.
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the Code of Good Practice requires those who have accepted it to provide
“sympathetic consideration to and adequate opportunity for” consultations with
one another. 147
c.

TBT Article 5

Article 5 addresses central governments’ efforts to regulate conformity
assessments, such as eco-label schemes that include certification criteria. 148
The provisions relevant to environmental marketing claims are similar to those
discussed above regarding the promulgation of technical regulations and
standards. The TBT defines “conformity assessments” as “[a]ny procedure”
that determines whether technical regulations or standards are fulfilled. 149
Applicable procedures include sampling, testing and inspecting, evaluation,
verification, assurance of conformity, registration, and accreditation. 150
Article 5 also requires members to ensure that they grant suppliers of
like products originating in other members’ territories access to conformity
assessment procedures that are “no less favorable” than those granted to like
products originating within the member. 151 Access includes the possibility of
performing conformity assessment procedures at suppliers’ facilities and the
capacity to receive any mark associated with the procedures. 152 As with
technical regulations and standards, conformity assessment measures may not
create “unnecessary obstacles to international trade.” 153
Conformity
assessment procedures must not, on their face, or as applied, be “more strict
than necessary” to provide the importing member with “adequate confidence”
that the products conform to the applicable standards or regulations. 154 Article
5 requires the conformity procedures to be implemented as “expeditiously as
possible” and in a manner that is no less favorable to products originating
within other members than to domestic products. 155 Of particular relevance to
the environmental marketing claim context, article 5 provides that where
international standardizing bodies have produced guides or recommendations
for conformity assessment procedures, members shall use them, unless doing
147

See id. at Annex 3, ¶ Q.
See id. at art. 5.
149
See id. at Annex 1, ¶ 3.
150
Id. at Explanatory Note.
151
See id. at art. 5.1.1.
152
See id.
153
See id. at art. 5.1.2.
154
See id.
155
See id. at art. 5.2.1. Conformity procedures may require those seeking assessment
provide only that information necessary to assess conformity and applicable fees. See id. at
art. 5.2.3. The procedures must protect confidential information and commercial interests. See
id. at art. 5.2.4. Fees must be equitable; facilities for conformity assessments must not cause
“unnecessary inconvenience.” Id. at art. 5.2.5. And the procedures must include a process for
receiving and responding to complaints. See id. at art. 5.2.8. The article expressly supports
members’ ability to carry out “reasonable” spot checks within their territories. See id. at art.
5.3.
148
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so would be inappropriate due to concerns such as preventing deceptive
practices or protecting the environment or animal and plant life. 156 This
provision raises the same issues noted above, regarding the ISO’s 14024
international standard for eco-labels.
As with technical regulations and standards, article 5 states that
members, “within the limits of their resources” shall play a “full part” in the
efforts of international standardizing bodies to develop conformity assessment
guides and recommendations. 157 Should a central government issue standards
that are not in accord with guides or recommendations issued by international
standardizing entities, or—should no relevant guides or recommendations
exist—central governments must follow the same general notice and comment
procedures discussed above under article 2. 158
d.

TBT Article 6

Article 6 directs central government bodies to “ensure, whenever
possible” that they accept the results of other members’ conformity assessment
procedures, even if different from their own, as long as they are satisfied that
the rigor of the conformity assessment procedures is equivalent to their own. 159
Article 6 contemplates that members may need to consult with one another to
arrive at a “mutually satisfactory understanding” regarding each other’s
conformity assessment procedures. 160 Article 6 encourages members to permit
the participation of conformity assessment bodies in other members in their
conformity assessment procedures under conditions that are “no less
favorable” than those provided to conformity assessment bodies within the
members’ territory. 161 Because there are few central government-based
environmental marketing claim conformity assessment procedures, article 6,
standing alone, has little impact on global environmental marketing claims.
For those environmental marketing schemes to which it applies, article 6 may
give rise to trade barriers for developing countries. Article 6 turns on whether
members are satisfied with one another’s conformity assessment processes.
Given that the legal and technical structures of developing countries are
significantly weaker than developed countries, satisfying a developed
country’s needs may be exceedingly difficult for a developing country. 162
e.

TBT Articles 7, 8, and 9

TBT articles 7 and 8 extend TBT articles 5 and 6 to local and non-state
actor entities involved in conformity assessment procedures, which would
156

See id. at art. 5.4.
See id. at art. 5.5.
158
See id. at art. 5.6.
159
See id. at art. 6.1.
160
See id.
161
See id. at art. 6.4.
162
See Islam, supra note 129.
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include those non-state actors that operate eco-label certification programs. 163
However, members need only use “reasonable” measures to ensure compliance
with articles 5 and 6. 164 The inherent difficulties with articles 5 and 6, noted
above, remain.
When a member requires assurance of conformity with a technical
regulation or standard, article 9 directs members to “formulate and adopt”
conformity assessment systems in conjunction with international conformity
assessment systems by becoming members of the systems or participating with
them. 165 As noted above in the discussion of developing country participation
in the development of international standards, fulfilling their obligation under
article 9 is especially difficult for developing countries, given their lack of
resources and criteria-setting infrastructure.
f.

TBT Article 11

Article 11 addresses the provision of technical assistance and advice to
other members, should the other members request such assistance or advice. 166
Article 11 emphasizes developed countries’ duty to provide technical
assistance and advice to developing countries. 167 Specifically, article 11
directs members to advise other members, especially developing country
members, on the preparation of technical regulations and conformity
assessment procedures and to provide advice and technical assistance on the
development of national standardizing bodies and participation in international
standardizing bodies. 168 Should a member, especially a developing country
member, seek access to the conformity assessment procedures of another
member for the developing country’s producers, the member shall grant the
developing country member technical assistance regarding the necessary steps
producers should take for their products to satisfy the other member’s
conformity assessment procedures. 169 If requested, members shall provide
technical assistance and advice to other members regarding the establishment
of institutions and legal frameworks that would enable the other members to
fulfill their obligations under international or regional conformity assessment
provisions. 170 Article 11 directs members, if requested, to encourage bodies
within their territories that participate in regional or international conformity
assessment procedures to provide advice and technical assistance to other
members seeking the ability to do the same. 171 Should a member decide to
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See TBT, supra note 32, at arts. 7.1, 8.1, 8.2.
See id.
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See id. at art. 9.
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See id. at art. 11.
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See id. at arts. 11.1–11.2.
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See id. at arts. 11.1–11.4.
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See id. at art. 11.5.
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See id. at art. 11.6.
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See id. at art. 11.7.
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provide advice and technical assistance to other members, members “shall give
priority to the needs of the least-developed country Members.” 172
g.

TBT Article 12

As noted above in the discussion of the Code of Good Practice, article
12 requires members to provide “differential and more favourable treatment to
developing countr[ies].” 173 Specifically, members must consider the special
needs of developing countries as they implement the TBT. 174 As they develop
regulations, standards, and conformity assessment procedures, members must
take into account the special needs of developing country members “with a
view” to ensuring that the members’ regulations, standards, and conformity
assessment procedures do not create “unnecessary obstacles to exports from
developing country Members.” 175 Members must recognize that developing
countries may not use international standards as a basis for their regulations or
standards when the international standards are not “appropriate to their
development, financial, and trade needs.” 176
Additionally, members must “take such reasonable measures as may be
available to them” to ensure that international standardizing and conformity
assessment bodies operate in such a manner that developing countries have
representation in the bodies and can play an active role in the bodies. 177
Should a developing country member seek international standards for a
product of special interest, members must take reasonable measures to ensure
that international standardizing bodies examine the possibility of developing
standards for the product, and if practicable, develop the standard. 178 Article
12 directs members to provide technical assistance to developing countries to
ensure that technical regulations, standards, and conformity assessment
procedures do not create “unnecessary obstacles to the expansion and
diversification of exports” from developing countries. 179
Article 12 recognizes that developing country members may face
special problems in preparing regulations, standards, and conformity
assessment procedures and that they may have difficulty fully discharging their
obligations under the TBT. 180 Article 12, therefore, empowers the TBT
committee to grant developing countries, upon request, specific, time-limited
exceptions from TBT obligations. 181 Developed country members “shall bear
in mind” developing countries’ special difficulties in complying with TBT
172

Id. at art. 11.8.
Id. at art. 12.1.
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See id. at art. 12.2.
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Id. at art. 12.3.
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Id. at art. 12.4.
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Id. at art. 12.5.
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See id. at art. 12.6.
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Id. at art. 12.7.
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See id. at art. 12.8.
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See id.
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obligations and “shall take account” of developing countries’ financing, trade,
and development needs as they assist developing countries. 182
On its face, article 12 recognizes difficulties developing countries face
and it appears to offer protections to developing countries; however, it has a
several shortcomings. First, article 12 places a number of obligations squarely
on the shoulders of WTO members. However, in the context of environmental
marketing claim regulation, members are not the primary actors. Instead, nonstate actors are responsible for the bulk of eco-label related standards. While
the TBT’s Code of Good Practice applies to such non-state actor criteriasetting bodies, the Code is not mandatory, and nothing in the Code of Good
Practice requires that non-state actors provide deferential treatment to
developing country members.
Second, to the extent the TBT requires the use of international
standards, it may disadvantage developing countries because nothing in article
12 requires that the non-state actor international standard-setting bodies that
produce the international standards achieve a threshold level of participation
from developing countries.
A recurring theme in article 12 and throughout the TBT is an attempt to
balance competing objectives. On one hand, the TBT proscribes regulations
that create unnecessary barriers to trade and seeks to harmonize state and nonstate actor regulatory schemes. On the other, it attempts to provide appropriate
deference to the needs of developing countries. To date, the precise scope of
the deferential side of the balance is unclear. There is no jurisprudence and no
decision from any competent WTO body to clarify members’ obligations under
article 12. 183
Third, the TBT makes no reference to relevant provisions of international
environmental agreements, such as the Montreal Protocol, the Basel
Convention, the Climate Change Convention, or the Biodiversity Convention,
that provide deferential treatment of developing countries. 184 Should a
developing country draw upon those agreements in support of its own
environmental marketing claim regulation or in response to a developed
country regulation, the impact of the international environmental agreements is
not clear. 185 The TBT’s emphasis on international standards, especially ISOgenerated standards, may encourage countries to ignore international
agreements in favor of ISO standards. 186
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Id. at art. 12.9.
TBT Article 14 provides that disputes arising under the TBT will be resolved under the
Dispute Settlement Body and will follow applicable GATT Provisions. See id. at art. 14.
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See Islam, supra note 129, at 29.
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See id.
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See id. at 30.
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Degree of Developing Country Interest Advancement:
Highest

Among the group of environmental marketing claim criteria-setting
bodies, developing countries’ own lawmakers and standardizing bodies
perform the best job of considering developing countries’ interests. Through
their legislative function and the public-private partnerships that characterize
their criteria-setting bodies, developing countries can determine their interests
and priorities and promote them. For example, Thailand administers its Green
Label 187 through the Thailand Environmental Institute, a non-state actor that
partners with industry and local and central governments in Thailand. 188 The
Green Label certifies the environmental effectiveness of consumers and
products ranging from fluorescent bulbs to cleaning agents to fertilizers. 189 It
also certifies some service providers, including dry cleaning, laundry services,
and gas stations. 190 Certification principles include life-cycle assessment, the
political importance of the good certified, the ability to satisfy proposed
criteria, and the existence of appropriate test methods. 191 Several of the
product criteria draw upon ISO/IEC standards. For example, certified
passenger cars must comply with Thai law and the management systems of
ISO 9001:2000 or ISO TS 16949. 192 The Green Label applies to twenty-five
product categories; 507 product models from seventy-five companies have
been certified. 193 In addition to its own Green Label, seventeen other ecolabels operate in Thailand. 194 Of the seventeen, one is firm-specific, and the
rest are industry-specific or inter-industry eco-labelers. 195
Mexico does not have a national eco-label; however, Ecolabel Index
reports that twenty-eight eco-labeling entities operate within Mexico. 196 The
eco-labels cover a vast array of products, from agricultural goods to
187

See Green Label, THAI. ENV’T INST., http://www.tei.or.th/greenlabel/index.html (last
visited Oct. 19, 2011).
188
See About TEI, THAI. ENV’T INST., http://www.tei.or.th/main.htm (last visited Oct. 19,
2011).
189
See Thai Green Label Products, THAI. ENV’T INST.,
http://www.tei.or.th/greenlabel/categories.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
190
See id.
191
See Criteria Development, THAI. ENV’T INST.,
http://www.tei.or.th/greenlabel/ctdevelopment.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
192
See TGL-33-04 Passenger Car, THAI. ENV’T INST.,
http://www.tei.or.th/greenlabel/Eng%20PDF/TGL-33-04.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2011).
193
See GREEN LABEL: THAILAND, LIST OF GREEN THAI LABEL PRODUCT 3 (2011),
http://www.tei.or.th/greenlabel/eng%20pdf/2011-06-Name-GL-eng.pdf.
194
See All Ecolabels in Thailand, ECOLABEL INDEX,
http://www.ecolabelindex.com/ecolabels/?st=country=th (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
195
See id. UPS uses a carbon neutral shipping label that informs consumers that UPS has
offset any greenhouse gas emissions through the purchase of carbon offset credits.
196
See All Ecolabels in Mexico, ECOLABEL INDEX,
http://www.ecolabelindex.com/ecolabels/?st=country=mx (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
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manufactured goods. 197 Two of the twenty-eight eco-labels are firm-specific
labels; the rest are either industry-specific or inter-industry eco-labels. 198
Recently, Mexico enacted a statute that regulates firms’ environmental
management systems. 199 Specifically, the statute regulates a firm’s selfdeclared claims about its environmental performance, and the statute sets up an
environmental management audit system, which allows a firm that complies
with the system’s reference terms to earn a certificate. 200 High-performing
firms may earn the Environmental Award of Excellence. 201 In addition,
Mexico’s Secretary of the Economy promulgated an internal regulation that
adopts an eco-label scheme identical to ISO 14024. 202
Like Mexico, Senegal has no national eco-label. In 2006, legislation
created the Mecanisme pour un Développmente Propre (MDP), charged with
taking on projects that will enhance Senegalese environmental practices. 203
Ecolabel Index reports that only one eco-label operates in Senegal; it is an
industry-specific label. 204
NON-STATE ACTOR ENVIRONMENTAL CRITERIA-SETTING BODIES

III.

A.

Characteristics

Because non-state actors set environmental criteria without
governmental authority, their criteria take the form of standards, guidelines,
and codes of best practices. The actors are typically international in scope and
197

See id.
See id. Firm-specific labels include UPS and Sherwin Williams.
199
See Reglamento de la Ley General Del Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al
Ambiente en Materia de Autoregulación y Auditorías Ambientales [LGEEPA] [Regulation of
the General Law of the Ecological Balance and the Protection to the Environmental
Atmosphere in the Matter of Self-Regulation and Audits], Diario Oficial de la Federación
[DO], 29 de abril de 2010 (Mex.).
200
See id. at arts. 1, 3.
201
See id. at art. 31.
202
See Etiquetas y Declaraciones Ambientales—Etiquetado Ambiental Tipo I—Principios
y Procedimientos [Environmental Labels and Declarations—Environmental Labelling Type
I—Principles and Procedures], DIARIO OFICIAL DE LA FEDERACIÓN [DO], 21 de mayo de 2004
(Mex.), available at http://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=678207&fecha=21/05/2004.
Mexico has also adopted ISO’s approach to life-cycle analysis. See Gestion Ambiental—
Analisis del Ciclo de Vida—Principios y Marco de Referencia [Environmental Management—
Analysis of the Life-Cycle—Principles and Frame of Reference], DIARIO OFICIAL DE LA
FEDERACIÓN [DO], 21 de mayo de 2004 (Mex.), available at
http://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=678207&fecha=21/05/2004.
203
See Arrêté Ministeriel No. 5610 (2006) (Sen.), available at
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/sen82370.pdf.
204
See All Ecolabels in (Senegal + Kenya), ECOLABEL INDEX,
http://www.ecolabelindex.com/ecolabels/?st=country=sn;country=ke (last visited Oct. 2,
2011). LEAF Marque is the only eco-labeler operating within Senegal. See id. LEAF Marque
promotes environmentally responsible farming and certifies those that satisfy its criteria. See
LINKING ENV’T & FARMING [LEAF], http://www.leafuk.org/leaf/home.eb (last visited Oct. 2,
2011).
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fall into one of four groups: those composed of national or regional criteriasetting bodies, firm-specific criteria-setting bodies, industry-specific bodies,
and inter-industry criteria-setting bodies.
a.

National or Regional Environmental Criteria-Setting
Bodies

Many countries have national standardizing bodies, though as noted
above, few engage in setting standards for environmental marketing claims.
Among the over 400 eco-labels, 205 only twenty-seven are national. 206 Of
those, five are from developing countries; the rest are from developed
countries. 207 Given that ISO is the most prevalent international standardizing
body, especially in the context of environmental marketing claim standards,
national standardizing body participation in ISO also sheds light on the scope
of national standardizing body activity. 45.8% of developing countries have
member bodies participating in ISO. 208 In contrast, 62.3% of developed
countries participate through member bodies. ISO Technical Committee 207
(TC 207) is charged with generating environmental standards. 209 30% of
205

See ECOLABEL INDEX, supra note 1.
See National Eco-Labels: Worldwide, DER BLAUE ENGEL, http://www.blauerengel.de/en/blauer_engel/whats_behind_it/national_eco-labels_worldwide.php (last visited
Oct. 2, 2011).
207
The six developing countries include the People’s Republic of China, India, Brazil
(state and non-state actor joint label), the Philippines (launched by national government,
maintained by non-state actor), and Thailand (state and non-state actor joint label). See id.
208
As noted above, developing countries are defined as low- to mid-income on the World
Bank’s World Resource Indicators; developed countries are defined as high income. ISO’s
membership is drawn from the list of its members on its website. See ISO Members, INT’L
ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, http://www.iso.org/iso/about/iso_members.htm (last visited Oct.
4, 2011). ISO defines member bodies as the national body “most representative of
standardization in its country.” See Member Bodies, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/about/iso_members/member_bodies.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
ISO accepts only one member body from each participating country. See id. Member bodies
may participate and vote on any policy or technical committee matter. See id. ISO also
permits corresponding memberships to national standardizing bodies that are not yet fully
developed. See Correspondent Members, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/about/iso_members/correspondent_members.htm (last visited Oct. 4,
2011). Such members may be kept informed of ISO work of interest. However, they may not
participate in meetings, and they may not vote. See id. 25% of developing countries are
corresponding members; 5.8% of developed countries are corresponding members. See ISO
Members, supra. Countries with “very small” economies may join ISO as subscriber
members. See Subscriber Members, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/about/iso_members/subscriber_members.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
Subscriber members pay reduced fees for membership that allows them to remain in contact
with international standardization, but it appears they do not have voting rights. See id. 7% of
developing countries are subscriber members of ISO; 0.0% of developed countries are
subscriber members. See ISO Members, supra.
209
See ISO/TC 207, http://www.tc207.org (last visited Oct. 4, 2011) (providing the
website for ISO’s TC 207 on Environmental Management).
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developing countries participate on TC 207; 42% of developed countries
participate on the committee. 210
Some developing countries participate in regional criteria-setting
entities, such as the African Organization for Standardization (ARSO). 211
Because of their regional scope, these criteria-setting bodies and organs
advance the interests of geographic regions rather than specific countries.
ARSO’s mandate is to “develop tools for standards development, standards
harmonization, and implementation of these systems to enhance Africa’s
internal trading capacity, increased [sic] Africa’s product and service
competitiveness globally, and uplift . . . the welfare of African consumers as
well as standardization forum for future prospects in international trade
referencing.” 212 Senegal is a founding member of ARSO. 213
Thailand is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). 214 ASEAN has taken on a number of environmental projects; in
2005, it sought to develop regional indicators for clean air, water, and land. 215
In addition, developing countries enter into formal relations with developed
countries to advance their interests in criteria setting, among other tasks.
Mexico’s Proyecto de Facilitación del Tradado de Libre Comercio entre
México y la Unión Europea (PROTLCEUM) is an agreement between Mexico
and the European Union, which, in its technical standards component,
increases each countries’ understanding of standards, regulations, and
conformity assessment processes. 216
b.

Firm-Specific Environmental Criteria-Setting Bodies

There are a wide variety of firm-specific eco-labels; each has its own
approach to setting environmental criteria and applying those criteria to
products. Walmart’s Sustainability Index is perhaps the best known firm210

ISO permits members to observe TC 207’s activities. See TC 207—Environmental
Management, supra note 41. 16% of developing countries have observer status on TC 207;
11.6% of developed countries have observer status on ISO. See id.
211
See AFR. ORG. FOR STANDARDISATION, http://www.arso-oran.org (last visited Oct. 4,
2011).
212
About ARSO, AFR. ORG. FOR STANDARDISATION, http://www.arso-oran.org/?page_id=2
(last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
213
See Présentation, supra note 37.
214
See Overview, ASS’N SE. ASIAN NATIONS, http://www.asean.org/64.htm (last visited
Oct. 4, 2011).
215
See Environment Sector, ASS’N SE. ASIAN NATIONS, http://www.asean.org/14470.htm
(last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
216
See Normalización Internacional, supra note 36. Topics within the agreement include
harmonizing criteria with international standards, improving the adequacy of conformity
assessment processes, and increasing understanding of the role of voluntary standards and
certifications. See Plan Operativo Global del Proyecto de Facilitación del Tratado de Libre
Comercio México Unión Europea para la Comisión Nacional de Normalización, SECRETÉRIA
DE ECONOMÍA, http://www.economia.gob.mx/swb/es/economia/p_Tratado (last visited Oct. 4,
2011).
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specific environmental criteria setting body. 217 As noted above, Walmart’s
goal is to provide a tool allowing consumers to assess the environmentally
responsible attributes of products they seek to purchase. 218 Development of
the tool requires that Walmart establish sustainability criteria for its
suppliers. 219
Chemical company BASF has developed an eco-efficiency label that
identifies products that have satisfied its eco-efficiency analysis. 220 The
analysis begins with defining a benefit that a customer may receive from a
product. 221 All products offering the benefit are collected, and a life-cycle
analysis is conducted on the products. 222 In addition, product production costs
are also collected. 223 Those products providing the least environmental impact
at the best cost are awarded the label. 224 A third-party has validated BASF’s
eco-efficiency analysis. 225 BASF has partnered with the UN Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO) and the UN Environment Program
(UNEP) to create a software program that allows small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries to assess the eco-efficiency of their
dye works; BASF has also engaged capacity building in Egypt. 226
The Home Depot uses an Eco Options label to signal products that have
less impact on the environment than other similar products. 227 Labeled
products include those that industry-specific criteria-setting bodies, such as
WaterSense and Forestry Stewardship Council (FSC), have certified and those
that a third-party has vetted through life-cycle analysis. 228
Timberland marks products with a Green Index that rates the products’
environmental impact. 229 The index is based on an assessment of the products’
climate impact, chemical use, and resource consumption. 230 Climate impact
217

See Sustainability Index, supra note 28.
See id.
219
See id.
220
See Eco-Efficiency Label, BASF CHEMICAL CO.,
http://www.basf.com/group/corporate/en/sustainability/eco-efficiency-analysis/labels/index
(last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
221
See FAQs, BASF CHEMICAL CO.,
http://www.basf.com/group/corporate/en/function:rendering-service:/faqsearch/faqsearchresult/resultCat/faq-sd_eco-efficiency/functions/faqsearch/faqsearch (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
222
See id.
223
See id.
224
See id.
225
See id.
226
See BASF’s Joint Co-Efficiency Project with UNIDO and UNEP, BASF CHEMICAL
CO., http://www.basf.com/group/corporate/en/sustainability/global-compact/unido-unep (last
visited Oct. 2, 2011).
227
See Eco Options, HOMEDEPOT.COM,
http://www6.homedepot.com/ecooptions/index.html? (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
228
See id. The Home Depot’s website provides no further information about the thirdparty certification process.
229
Green Index Rating, TIMBERLAND.COM, http://responsibility.timberland.com/greenindex-rating (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
230
See id.
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uses an ISO 14000 compliant life-cycle analysis to measure greenhouse gas
emissions. 231 Chemical use focuses on the presence of polyvinyl chloride and
solvent adhesives. 232 Resource consumption considers the percentage of
recycled, organic, and renewable sources within the products. 233 Nothing in
Timberland’s literature suggests that it exposes the products to third-party
verification.
c.

Industry-Specific Environmental Criteria-Setting Bodies

The vast majority of eco-labels are the product of non-state actor
industry-specific environmental criteria-setting bodies. 234 These organizations
are typically international in scope and develop expertise in setting criteria for
a single industry or small group of industries. Examples include FSC 235 and
the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). 236
Each generates standards of
conduct and certification schemes, including an eco-label for its respective
industry. 237 FSC creates policies and standards that support worldwide
responsible forestry management. 238 It draws upon third-party certification
bodies to assess whether entities seeking use of the FSC label have satisfied the
FSC criteria. 239 Likewise, MSC sets policy and standards for fisheries, and it,
too, draws upon third-party certifiers to assess whether fisheries have satisfied
the MSC standards. 240 MSC provides technical assistance to fisheries that
have not yet satisfied MSC standards. 241 MSC also has a Developing World
Program designed to build capacity among developing country fisheries and to
facilitate developing country participation in its policy and standard-setting
activities. 242
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See id.
See id.
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See id.
234
See All Ecolabels, ECOLABEL INDEX, http://www.ecolabelindex.com/ecolabels (last
visited Oct. 2, 2011).
235
See FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.fsc.org (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
236
See MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.msc.org (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
237
See FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, supra note 235; MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL,
supra note 236.
238
See Policy & Standards, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL,
http://www.fsc.org/policy_standards.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
239
See Accreditation Program, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL,
http://www.fsc.org/accreditation.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
240
See Get Certified! Fisheries, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL,
http://www.msc.org/get-certified/fisheries (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
241
See Find a Consultant for Fishery Improvements, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL,
http://www.msc.org/get-certified/fisheries/technical-assistance/consultants (last visited Oct. 2,
2011).
242
See About the Developing World Program, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL,
http://www.msc.org/about-us/credibility/working-with-developing-countries/about-thedeveloping-world-programme (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
232

33

34

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW

d.

2011

Inter-Industry Environmental Criteria-Setting Bodies

Inter-industry environmental criteria-setting bodies can be roughly
divided into three groups: (1) those that focus on setting standards that any
industry can use, such as ISO, (2) those that certify firms’ efforts to set
environmental criteria, such as the Consumer Goods Forum (CGF), and (3)
those that both set inter-industry criteria and certify against those criteria, such
as Green Business.
With the release of its environmental management system standard,
ISO has become a major player among non-state actor environmental criteriasetting bodies. It has generated a number of standards related to environmental
marketing claims, including ISO 14020, providing general principles for
environmental labels; ISO 14021 for self-declared environmental marketing
claims: ISO 14024 for third-party claims; ISO 14025 for claims regarding
products’ life cycles; ISO 14040, which provides a framework for conducting
life-cycle analysis; ISO 14044 for life-cycle analysis requirements and
guidelines; and ISO 14049, which provides examples for conducting life-cycle
analysis. 243 In addition, ISO has developed a number of standards related to
the collection and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions (ISO 14064 series),
and ISO is currently developing a standard for determining carbon
footprints. 244
ISO’s standards are generic in the sense that any firm can use the
standards to develop its own environmental marketing scheme, but standards
are also specific in that they provide definitions of commonly used terms and
criteria for environmental label development and maintenance. 245 ISO does
not certify that firms are in compliance with its standards; instead, it sets
criteria for certifying bodies. 246 As noted above, ISO sets standards through
technical committees (TCs); TC 207 is charged with generating environmental

243

See TC 207/SC 3: Environmental Labelling, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_tc_browse.htm?commid=54836
(last visited Oct. 2, 2011); TC 207/SC 5: Life Cycle Assessment, INT’L ORG. FOR
STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_tc_browse.htm?commid=54854
(last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
244
See TC 207/SC 7: Greenhouse Gas Management and Related Activities, INT’L ORG.
FOR STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_tc_browse.htm?commid=546318
(last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
245
See, e.g., ISO 14024 (providing a set of definitions for commonly used environmental
marketing claims, including recyclable, compostable, and biodegradable, and also providing
the steps a firm must negotiate to create an environmental label scheme).
246
See, e.g., ISO 14024 Part 7 (listing items certifiers must consider and procedures for
assessing compliance with the eco-label).
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management standards. 247 TC 207, like other ISO TCs, is made up of member
bodies or observers. 248 Each member or observer represents the national
standardizing body of one country. 249 The national standardizing bodies may
be state or non-state actors. 250 They are expected to take into account the
views of all national stakeholders relevant to the standard under
development. 251 Once TC member bodies have drafted a standard, they vote
on it; if two-thirds vote in favor and no more than one-quarter vote against it,
the final draft standard is sent to all member bodies for a vote. 252 Again, if
two-thirds vote for and no more than one quarter vote against, the standard is
accepted as an international standard. 253 If a draft or final standard fails to
achieve the required threshold votes, it is sent back to the TC for further
revision. 254
Like ISO, CGF sets general environmental criteria but does not certify
firms’ compliance with the criteria. In contrast with ISO, which has ties to
national government standardizing bodies, CGF is a global network of 650
retailers, manufacturers, service providers, and other stakeholders. 255 It began
in 2009 with the merger of Comité International d’Entreprises à Succursales
(CIES), a network of food and consumer goods retailers, and CEO Forum and
Global Commerce Initiative, which were networks of retailers and
manufacturers. 256
CGF’s mandate is to “develop common positions on key strategic and
operational issues affecting the consumer goods business.” 257 Sustainability is
one of the organization’s “strategic priorities.” 258 CGF is developing common
positions on sustainability through the Global Social Compliance Programme
(GSCP). 259 Currently GSCP has thirty-two members, including adidas, Best
247

See TC 207: Environmental Management, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_tc_browse.htm?commid=54808
(last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
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See TC 207, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION [ISO],
http://www.iso.org/iso/standards_development/technical_committees/list_of_iso_technical_co
mmittees/iso_technical_committee.htm?commid=54808 (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
249
See How ISO Develops Standards, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/about/how_iso_develops_standards.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
250
See id.
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See id.
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See id.
253
See id.
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See id.
255
See Who We Are, CONSUMER GOODS FORUM,
http://www.theconsumergoodsforum.com/1-wweare/index.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
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See Who We Are, History, CONSUMER GOODS FORUM,
http://www.theconsumergoodsforum.com/1-wweare/1.1-history/index.asp (last visited Oct. 2,
2011).
257
Who We Are, supra note 255.
258
See id.
259
See Who We Are: Our Professional Committees, CONSUMER GOODS FORUM,
http://www.theconsumergoodsforum.com/1-wweare/1.4-committees/index.asp (last visited
Oct. 2, 2011).
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Buy, Dole, Ikea, and Walmart. 260 Any “buying companies” worldwide may
join GSCP, regardless of the nature of the consumer goods sold, and
participants need not be members of CGF. 261 GSCP has developed a set of
reference tools representing the common knowledge available on sustainability
issues. 262 Members commit themselves to non-competitive use of the tools,
meaning that their compliance with the tools may not be used for marketing or
seeking a competitive advantage over other retailers. 263 Instead, the tools are
designed to build upon international standards and harmonize existing
systems. 264 All tools are freely available to GSCP members and nonmembers. 265
GSCP has released three tools that address firms’ environmental
practices:
Environmental Reference Requirements, Environmental
Implementation Guidelines, and Reference Environmental Audit Process. 266
The Environmental Reference Requirements describe environmental best
practices and a set of common interpretations of environmental requirements
and their implementations. 267 The tool is designed for sites across a supply
chain. 268
The Environmental Reference Requirements provide three levels of
performance: Awareness and Compliance, Proactive Management and
Performance Improvement, and Leading Practice. 269 At Level 1, the firm must
demonstrate that it has a basic environmental management structure, it is aware
of its significant environmental aspects and impacts, it is aware of and
complies with applicable legal requirements, and it provides workers with
information and training regarding environmental issues. 270 Level 1’s focus is
on site-level operations, activities, and potential environmental impacts. 271
260

See GSCP Members: The Task Force, GLOBAL SOC. COMPLIANCE PROGRAMME,
http://www.gscpnet.com/structure-a-governance/task-force.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
261
See id.
262
See What is the Global Social Compliance Programme (GSCP)?, GLOBAL SOC.
COMPLIANCE PROGRAMME, http://www.gscpnet.com/about-the-gscp/about-the-gscp.html (last
visited Oct. 2, 2011).
263
See id.
264
See id.
265
See id.
266
See GSCP Environmental Reference Tools, GLOBAL SOC. COMPLIANCE PROGRAMME,
http://www.gscpnet.com/working-plan/environmental-module.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
267
See GLOBAL SOC. COMPLIANCE PROGRAMME, ENVIRONMENTAL REFERENCE
REQUIREMENTS 2 (2010) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL REFERENCE REQUIREMENTS], available
at http://www.gscpnet.com/gscpfiles/GSCP_Environmental_Reference_Requirements.pdf.
268
See id.
269
See id. at 3.
270
See id. at 4. The Reference Requirements cover the following “performance areas”:
environmental management system, energy use, transport and greenhouse gases, water use,
wastewater effluent, emissions to air, waste management, pollution prevention/hazardous and
potentially hazardous substances, major incident prevention and management, contaminated
land/soil and groundwater pollution prevention, land use and biodiversity, and nuisances. See
id. at 5.
271
See id.
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Level 2 requires that the firm have an environmental management
system in place, that the firm engage workers and representatives in
environmental issues, that its environmental practices are consistent with
international standards, and that the firm demonstrates that it is managing all
significant environmental aspects and impacts, and achieving performance
improvement targets. 272 Level 2 moves the firm’s focus from its site to its
interactions with and influences on the local environment. 273
Level 3 requires that the firm’s environmental management and
performance exceed industry standards, the firm engages with key stakeholders
to achieve “significant” improvement in performance, the firm considers its
environmental impact and influence on areas beyond the firm’s local
environment, and that the firm demonstrates leadership in environmental
management and the ability to stretch its performance improvement targets. 274
Should a firm find that applicable international, regional, national, or local
environmental regulations are more stringent than the GSCP reference
requirements, the regulations “shall take precedence.” 275
GSCP’s Environmental Implementation Guidelines provide guidance
for the implementation of the Environmental Reference Requirements. 276 For
each Reference Requirement, the Guidelines provide background information,
interpretations, a set of action statements, and examples for how to comply
with the action statements and the Reference Requirement. 277
GSCP’s Reference Environmental Audit Process & Methodology
provides a set of best practices and tools for auditing the environmental
management practices of firms within a retailer’s supply chain. 278 The
Reference’s topics include risk assessment, preparing for and conducting
audits, and interpreting the audit results. 279 The audit materials are based on
the Environmental Reference Requirements but can be adapted to other
environmental practice codes. 280 The audit tools include self assessments, preaudit site profiles, audit checks, alert notifications, audit reports, summaries of
findings and corrective action, and supplemental audit information. 281
Like ISO and CGF, ISEAL sets environmental criteria but does not
certify compliance with the criteria. ISEAL is more like CGF than ISO
because it is a purely private entity, but in contrast to CGF, which sets
environmental standards for buying companies, ISEAL sets standards for firms
272

See id.
See id.
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See id.
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See id.
276
See GSCP, Environmental Implementation Guidelines (2010), available at
http://www.gscpnet.com/gscpfiles/GSCP_Environmental_Implementation_Guidelines.pdf.
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See id. at 15–16.
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See GSCP, Reference Environmental Audit Process & Methodology (2010), available
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that certify other firms’ environmentally responsible practices within specific
industries.
ISEAL is essentially a non-profit association of non-state
standardizing bodies. 282 It provides guidance and support to entities that
generate voluntary social and environmental standards. 283 Its guidance
includes a set of good practice codes; its support includes working with private
companies, other non-profits, and governments that use or reference voluntary
codes. 284 ISEAL’s Codes of Good Practice currently include a guide for
Setting Social and Environmental Standards 285 (Standard-Setting Code) and an
Assessing the Impacts of Social and Environmental Standard Systems 286
(Impacts Code). ISEAL is currently drafting an Assurance Code, which will
provide guidance on auditor competence, audit implementations, transparency,
consistency in standard interpretation, and accessibility to audit systems. 287
ISEAL expects to publish its first draft of the Assurance Code in 2012. 288
282

See About Us, ISEAL ALLIANCE, http://www.isealalliance.org/content/about-us (last
visited Oct. 3, 2011) [hereinafter ISEAL ALLIANCE]. Full members of ISEAL include the
Forestry Stewardship Council, Marine Stewardship Council, Rainforest Alliance, and
Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels. Full Members, ISEAL ALLIANCE,
http://www.isealalliance.org/organisation/full_members (last visited Nov. 1, 2011) [hereinafter
ISEAL Full Members]. Associate members are those that are committed to complying with the
ISEAL codes but are not yet in full compliance. Associate members include Alliance for
Water Stewardship, Bonsucro, Global Footprint Network, and People 4 Earth. See Associate
Members, ISEAL ALLIANCE, http://www.isealalliance.org/organisation/associate_members
(last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
283
See ISEAL ALLIANCE, supra note 282.
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See id.
285
See ISEAL, Setting Social and Environmental Standards v.5.0 (2010), available at
http://www.isealalliance.org/sites/default/files/P005_ISEAL_Std-Setting_Code_v5.01.pdf
[hereinafter Standard-Setting Code] (last visited Nov. 05, 2011). ISEAL is submitting its
Standard-Setting Code to a review process scheduled to begin in 2013. See id. at 2. The
process will establish a steering committee that will make revisions to the code in light of
comments previously received, open the code to public comment, consider the comments,
make any needed revisions to the code, and submit the revised code to the ISEAL Stakeholder
Council for a recommendation regarding approval. See id. If the council recommends
approval, the revised code would be submitted to the ISEAL Board for approval. See id.
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See ISEAL, Assessing the Impacts of Social and Environmental Standards Systems
v.1.0 (2010) [hereinafter ISEAL Impacts Code], available at
http://www.isealalliance.org/sites/default/files/P041_ISEAL_Impacts_Codev1.0.pdf (last
visited Nov. 05, 2011).
287
See Patrick Mallet & Paddy Doherty, The ISEAL Assurance Code (June 10, 2011),
available at
http://www.isealalliance.org/sites/default/files/Assurance%20Code%20Presentation%20Jun%2
010%202011.pdf (last visited Nov. 05, 2011).
288
See id. ISEAL’s Assurance Code July 2011 Newsletter sheds some light on the
direction the code is taking. See Paddy Doherty, The ISEAL Assurance Code Newsletter July
2011, available at
http://www.isealalliance.org/sites/default/files/Assurance%20Code%20Newsletter%20July%2
02011.pdf (last visited Nov. 05, 2011). The Code’s goal is to develop a model of assurance
that will “help deliver the sustainability aspects of the standards system.” Id. Assurance that
standards are met should not be seen as a purely regulatory function. See id. Instead,
assurance should be a collaborative process, such that the producer and the certifier work
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Because the Assurance Code is not complete, the Article will briefly
summarize ISEAL’s Standard-Setting and Impacts Codes.
The Standard-Setting Code provides standardizing bodies with criteria
to determine whether organizations that use the standardizing bodies’ standards
will make progress toward achieving their environmental objectives, without
creating unnecessary barriers to trade. 289 The Standard-Setting Code draws
upon the ISO/IEC Guide 59 Code of Good Practice for Standardization, the
TBT’s Code of Good Practice, and the TBT’s Principles for the Development
of International Standards. 290 ISEAL’s code notes that the ISO/IEC and TBT
good practice guides were not specifically designed for environmental
standards. 291 The Standard-Setting Code states that it serves to complement
and coexist with the ISO/IEC and TBT guides, providing information
especially relevant to environmental standard setters. 292 In addition to its code
provisions, ISEAL’s Standard-Setting Code includes “non-binding” guidance
provisions, designed to build capacity for standardizing bodies. 293 The
Standard-Setting Code applies only to voluntary standards. 294
Organizations seeking to claim compliance with the Standard-Setting
Code must adopt the entire code 295 and must demonstrate their compliance to
an “independent evaluation mechanism” that ISEAL has established. 296 Upon
commencement of standard development, the Code requires that the
organization generate and publish a set of “terms of reference,” which include
the following elements: (1) justification of the need for the standard; (2)
objectives of the standard; and (3) assessment of the risk of implementing
the standards and a plan for mitigating them. 297
The Code’s guidance further requires that the standardizing body
identify relevant interested parties and any groups subject to being
disadvantaged by the standard, such as developing countries. 298 Interested
parties include any individual or group that a standard concerns or directly
affects. 299 The standardizing body must generate a stakeholder map that
identifies the proposed standards’ major interest sectors, key interested parties,
key stakeholders, and a means to communicate with them. 300 The body must
approach stakeholders, proactively seeking their contribution to the standard-

together to see that the client reaches its goal. See id. In addition, the Assurance Code should
explain the relationship between certifier capacity building and certifier impartiality. See id.
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See Standard-Setting Code, supra note 285, at 3.
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See id.
291
See id. ¶ 1.2
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See id.
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See id. at 3
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See id. ¶¶ 1.2, 3.3.
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See id. ¶ 4.1.1.
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See id. ¶ 4.1.2.
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See id. ¶ 3.2.
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See id. ¶ 5.3.1.
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development process. 301 And, in an effort to maintain consistency among
standards, the standardizing body must inform organizations that have
generated related standards of its proposed standard and invite their
participation. 302 When the process impacts disadvantaged groups, such as
developing countries, the standardizing body must seek to fund the groups’
participation; when not possible, the body must look to other means to
facilitate their participation, such as through technical assistance and capacity
building. 303
In addition, the standardizing body must make its terms of reference,
standard-setting process, and decision-making process publicly available, at
least in electronic form on the body’s website. 304 The standardizing body must
give interested parties an opportunity to comment on the summary of the
standard and the proposed terms of reference. 305 The standardizing body must
receive comments for a reasonable time and have a process in place for
considering the comments. 306 The decision-making process must “strive for
consensus,” 307 in other words, general agreement—the absence of sustained
opposition from important concerned interests on substantial issues. 308 The
body must define criteria for determining whether the body will consider an
alternative decision-making process, such as voting, and the method for the
voting. 309 The body must ensure that the decision-making process will not
allow a significant interest group to dominate or be dominated during the
process. 310 Instead, the decision-making process must be characterized by a
“balance of interests” among all interested parties. 311 When a standardizing
body limits decision-making to its members, it must provide membership
criteria that is “transparent and non-discriminatory.” 312
Furthermore, the standard’s objective must be clear and explicitly
313
stated.
The standard’s structure must form a “logical framework” that links
the standard’s objective to its principles, criteria, indicators, and verifiers. 314
The structure must allow for an assessment of progress toward achieving the
301
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See id. ¶ 5.2.2.
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310
See id. ¶ 5.9.2.
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See id. ¶ 5.5.1.
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See id. ¶ 5.5.3. Transparency requires that the membership decision-making process
and justification for a membership decision must be made available to the applicant. See id. at
¶ 5.5.3 Guidance Provisions. Membership criteria is non-discriminatory when the criteria is
objective, the fees are not excessive, and the process ensures all parties interested in
membership receive “objective and transparent” treatment. See id.
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standard’s objective. 315 A standardizing body must express the standard’s
structure in terms of “process, management and performance criteria” not
“design or descriptive” terms. 316 Thus, the standard’s focus must be on the
way a product is produced, the way production is managed, and the actual
practices that define the way the product performs. 317 The standard should not
be prescriptive or descriptive but outcomes-based. 318 A standardizing body
must use existing international standards as the basis for regional or national
standards, unless doing so would be “ineffective or inappropriate.” 319 Such
conditions arise upon consideration of “fundamental climactic, geographic, or
technical factors,” cultural factors, and economic and regulatory conditions. 320
When adopting international standards, the standardizing body must develop
“interpretive guidance” that explains how to take into account local conditions
when applying the standards. 321 A standard must be “no more trade-restrictive
than necessary” to fulfill its objective. 322
Once a standardizing body develops a draft standard, it must subject the
draft to at least one comment round. 323 If the comment round results in
persisting unresolved issues, the body must subject the draft to a second
comment round. 324 In general the comment rounds should last for sixty
days. 325 The body must take all comments into account, either by
incorporating into the standard the issue area that the comment addresses or by
providing a justification for not incorporating it. 326 The body must prepare a
written synopsis of how it has addressed each issue raised in the comments it
has received. 327 It must then publish the synopsis and send it to all parties that
submitted comments. 328
The standardizing body must promptly place all final standards in the
public domain and make them available for free in electronic format. 329 The
body must make hard copies available upon request, charging only reasonable
administrative costs. 330 In addition to publishing its standards, the body must
also make its work program publicly available, updating it every six months. 331
315
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320
See TBT, supra note 32, at Annex 3, ¶ F.
321
See Standard-Setting Code, supra note 285, ¶ 6.5.2.
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The work program must include the body’s contact information and the scope,
objective, and rationale for each standard. 332
ISEAL’s Impacts Code is a tool that standardizing bodies can utilize to
determine whether their assessment of their standardizing systems is
effective. 333 Like the Standard-Setting Code, the Impacts Code is expressly
applicable to environmental standardizing bodies. 334 The Code is based on a
set of assessment principles, which include ensuring that the assessment (1)
has an appropriate scope; (2) has a practical focus, meaning that it makes
effective use of resources and has a realistic approach to assessment; (3) has
consistent and credible evaluations and impact assessments; (4) is open to
stakeholders’ scrutiny; (5) provides effective communication; (6) invites broad
stakeholder participation; (7) leads to improved effectiveness; and (8) springs
from the standardizing body’s institutional capacity. 335
The substantive portions of the Impacts Code enable a standardizing
body to assess whether its standards system is achieving its goals. 336 In the
context of a review that involves stakeholders and a transparent setting, the
Impacts Code has the standardizing body identify its long-term sustainability
goals, link those goals to the issues that the body wants to address, and define
the desired sustainability impacts, expected outcomes, and outcome
indicators. 337
In addition, the standardizing body must assess the
effectiveness of the strategies that support standard adoption and
compliance. 338 The strategies include verification of standards’ compliance,
the presence of incentives to encourage compliance, promotions of the
standard, provision of capacity training, and efforts to advocate for the
recognition of the standards in regulation. 339 The Impacts Code provides
standards and guidance for conducting the review of standards systems,
covering topics such as indicator selection, data collection, data management,
and data confidentiality. 340 And the Impacts Code provides standards for
evaluation of the data obtained, for learning from the evaluation, and for
improving standards systems in light of the evaluation. 341
In contrast to ISO, CGF, and ISEAL, the Green Business Network sets
environmental marketing claim criteria and certifies firms’ compliance with its
criteria. Green Business offers a seal of approval to a variety of industries,
including consumer products and services. 342 Firms interested in the seal
332

See id.
See ISEAL Impacts Code, supra note 286, at 3.
334
See id. at 1.
335
See id. at 4.
336
See id.
337
See id. ¶¶ 8.1–8.4, 9.1.
338
See id. ¶ 8.5
339
See id.
340
See id. ¶¶ 9.1–9.7.
341
See id. ¶¶ 10–11.
342
See Standards & Ratings System, GREEN BUSINESS NETWORK,
http://www.greenbusinessnetwork.org/seal-of-approval/standards-and-rating-system.html (last
visited Nov. 1, 2011).
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submit an application. Upon receipt, Green Business screens the firms against
Green Business’ criteria. 343 The criteria include general terms, such as
environmentally responsible sourcing, manufacturing, and marketing, and
more specific criteria, depending upon the firms’ industries. 344 Some of the
specific criteria are Green Business-generated. For example, the principles
that Green Business applies to a clothing and fabric producer include whether
the firm uses certified organic, reclaimed, or recycled fibers or other
sustainable materials. 345 Its preferences for such firms include the use of
natural or low-impact dyes that are fiber reactive and phosphate free. 346
Others are based on industry-specific criteria-setting bodies, such as the Global
Organic Textile Standard. 347 In 2011, Green Business began an internal audit
of firms using its seal; its plan is to audit members at least once every three
years. 348 Green Business operates through a non-profit organization called
Green America. 349 In addition to operating Green Business, Green America
also publishes National Green Pages, which lists businesses that have received
Green Business’ seal and other businesses that satisfy its “basic criteria,”
though the basic criterion is not defined. 350
B.

Legal Landscape Applicable to Non-State Actor CriteriaSetting Bodies

This Part of the Article will first describe the existing relevant WTO
law, focusing on the portions of the TBT and its Code of Good Practice
applicable to non-state actors 351 and the TBT Committee’s decision on
343

See id.
See id.
345
See Clothing and Fabric Products, GREEN BUSINESS NETWORK,
http://www.greenbusinessnetwork.org/clothing-a-fabric-products.html (last visited Oct. 4,
2011).
346
See id.
347
See id. (linking to GLOBAL ORGANIC TEXTILE STANDARD (GOTS), http://www.globalstandard.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2011)).
348
See Screening FAQ, GREEN BUSINESS NETWORK,
http://www.greenbusinessnetwork.org/seal-of-approval/screening-faq-.html (last visited Oct. 4,
2011).
349
See Green America–About Us, GREEN AMERICA, http://www.greenamerica.org/about/
(last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
350
See National Green Pages Sign-up, NATIONAL GREEN PAGES,
http://www.greenpages.org/advertise.php (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
351
Note that the discussion here does not focus on TBT article 3 because that article
applies to local state and any non-state actor promulgation of technical regulations. See TBT,
supra note 32, at art. 3. Because environmental marketing claims are generally voluntary, they
do not fall within the TBT’s definition of technical regulation. See id. at Annex 1 ¶ 1. The
article requires members to take “such reasonable measures as may be available to them” to
ensure that local and non-state actors comply with the provisions of article 2, noted above,
except for the provisions regarding notice to other members. See id. at art. 3.1. Members are
“fully responsible” for their observance of article 2’s provisions as well as the observance of
local governments and non-state actors operating within their territories. See id. at art. 3.5. The
344

43

44

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW

2011

Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides, and
Recommendations with Relation to articles 2, 5, and Annex 3 of the
Agreement. 352
Next, this Part will examine whether the existing law
obligates non-state actors such as those described above to integrate
developing country interests into their standards development processes.
1.

WTO Law Applicable to Non-State Actor CriteriaSetting Bodies
a.

Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade

As noted above, TBT article 4 requires members to take “reasonable
measures” to ensure that non-governmental standardizing bodies operating
within their territories are complying with the TBT Code of Good Practice. 353
Significant substantive provisions of the Code of Good Practice include
standardizing bodies’ obligations to treat domestic products “no less
favorably” than foreign “like products” 354 and to ensure that the standard
development process does not create “unnecessary obstacles to international
trade.” 355
A threshold question is whether the non-state actors described above
fall within the TBT definition of non-governmental standardizing bodies. TBT
Annex 1 defines a non-governmental body as a body other than a central or
local governing body. 356 Thus, each of the non-state actors described above,
from national and regional standardizing bodies to Walmart to Timberland to
ISO and ISEAL, would qualify as a non-governmental body because each is
not central or local governing bodies. The next issue is whether the non-state
actors described above are standardizing bodies within the context of the TBT.
The TBT does not define “standardizing body,” but it defines “standard.” As
noted above, a standard is a document that a “recognized body” has approved,
which provides:
For common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or
characteristics for products or related processes and
article requires members to form and implement “positive measures” that will assure local and
non-state actor are observing article 2’s requirements. See id.
352
See Decisions and Recommendations Adopted by the WTO Committee on Technical
Barriers to Trade Since 1 January 1995, G/TBT/Rev.9, Annex B (Sept. 8, 2008).
353
See TBT, supra note 32, at art. 4.1.
354
See id. at Annex 3, ¶ D.
355
See id. at Annex 3, ¶ E.
356
See id. at Annex 1, § 7. The definition expressly includes those non-central and local
governing bodies that have legal power to enforce technical regulations. See id. However, the
definition does not limit non-governmental bodies to those that have legal power to enforce
technical regulations; it merely states that those bodies fall within the definition. See id. In the
context of environmental marketing claims, the authority to enforce technical regulations is
rarely at issue because the applicable criteria are voluntary standards, not mandatory
regulations.
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production methods, with which compliance is not
mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with
terminology, symbols, packaging, marking, or labelling
requirements as they apply to a product, process or
production method. Logically, a body that makes standards
is a standardizing body. 357
Nothing in the TBT, its definitional annex, or its interpretations defines
“recognized body,” but because the TBT definitional annex defines a number
of bodies, including local governing, central governing, regional, international,
and non-governmental, a fair inference can be drawn that “recognized body”
refers to one of the bodies defined in the annex. 358 Given that, as previously
noted, the TBT Annex broadly defines non-governmental bodies and the nonstate actors described here fit within that definition, for the purpose of the
TBT’s definition of standard, the non-state actors are “recognized bodies.”
Attention next turns to whether the actions of the non-state actors are
standardizing actions. Again, the breadth of the TBT standard definition likely
catches the non-state actors identified here. Without question, national and
regional standardizing bodies are engaged in the practice of producing
standards. In addition, Walmart’s Sustainability Index, BASF’s eco-efficiency
label, and Timberland’s Green Index are standards for the purpose of the TBT
because the schemes provide voluntary guidelines or characteristics for
products. For the same reason, ISO, CGF, and ISEAL are each standardizing
bodies. Thus, to ensure standardizing body compliance with the TBT Code of
Good Practice, members’ obligations under TBT article 4 apply to each of the
non-state actor criteria-setting bodies described here.
b.

Principles to Guide the
International Standards

Development

of

TBT article 15.4 requires the WTO’s TBT committee to meet every
three years and “review the operation and implementation” of the TBT to
ensure members’ “mutual economic advantage” and balance members’ “rights
and obligations” under the TBT. 359 During its second triennial review, which
took place at a series of meetings from 1998-2000, 360 the TBT committee
357

See id. at Annex 1, ¶ 2.
TBT Annex 1 notes that the terms used in the TBT that are the same as those used in
the ISO/IEC Guide 2:1991 have the same meaning as assigned in the ISO/IEC Guide.
However, nothing in the ISO/IEC Guide 2:1991 defines “recognized body.” See Arthur E.
Appleton, Supermarket Labels and the TBT Agreement, 4 BUS. L. BRIEF 10, 12, nn. 20–22
(Fall 2007). The Guide defines “body” as a “‘legal or administrative entity that has specific
tasks and composition.’” Id. at 21.
359
See TBT, supra note 32, at art. 15.4.
360
See WTO Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Second Triennial Review of the
Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, G/TBT/9, at
2 (Nov. 13, 2000).
358
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reached a decision on the Principles to Guide the Development of International
Standards under TBT articles 2, 5, and the Code of Good Practice (Standards
Development Principles). 361 The Standards Development Principles reflect the
committee’s recognition that “[a]dverse trade effects might arise from
standards emanating from international bodies” that lacked “procedures for
soliciting input from a wide range of interests.” 362 Therefore, for international
standards to have their maximum impact on the “trade-facilitating objectives of
the [a]greement,” all members should have “the opportunity to participate in
the elaboration and adoption of international standards.” 363 To ensure that “all
members” have such opportunities, the Standards Development Principles set
levels for standardizing bodies’ transparency, openness, impartiality,
consensus, relevance, effectiveness, coherence, and consideration of
developing countries’ constraints on participation in standards development. 364
Nothing in the Standards Development Principles or the statement of
background and purpose supporting them explicitly states to whom the
Principles apply. However, the Standards Development Principles state that
they relate to TBT articles 2, 5, and Annex 3. 365 TBT articles 2 and 5 address
members’ central governing bodies; 366 the Code of Good Practice applies to
any standardizing body that chooses to accept it. 367 Thus, the Standards
Development Principles apply directly to members’ central governing bodies
and any standardizing body that has accepted the Code of Good Practice.
Given that, as noted above, the non-state actor criterion-setting bodies
described here are standardizing bodies, any bodies that have accepted the
TBT Code of Good Practice must also comply with the Standards
Development Principles.
1.

Transparency

Standardizing bodies should make “all essential information” regarding
their work on standards development “easily accessible” to at least the
interested parties within members’ territories. 368 Transparency processes
should minimally include: (1) notifications regarding proposed standards
should be made early enough for interested parties to become familiar with the
proposals; (2) sufficient notice of draft standards should be given early enough
361

See WTO Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Decisions and Recommendations
Adopted by the Committee since 1 January 1995, G/TBT/1/Rev.7, at 26 (Nov. 28, 2000).
362
See Decision of the Committee on Principles for the Development of International
Standards, Guides, and Recommendations, with Relation to Articles 2, 5, and Annex 3 of the
Agreement, WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Decisions and
Recommendations Adopted by the Committee since 1 January 1995, G/TBT/1/Rev.7, at § IX
(Nov. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Principles for the Development of International Standards].
363
See id.
364
See id.
365
See id.
366
See TBT, supra note 32, at art. 2, 5.
367
See id. at Annex 3, ¶ B.
368
See Principles for the Development of International Standards, supra note 362, ¶ 3.
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and in sufficient detail so that others can comment on the drafts and the
comments can be considered through discussion or amendment to the
standards; (3) standardizing bodies should promptly provide the full text of
draft standards to members of the international standardizing body and
promptly publish standards upon adoption; and (4) standardizing bodies should
periodically publish their work programs indicating standards under
development and those adopted. 369
The Principle recognizes the utility of the Internet in communicating
essential information about standards to others, but it also recognizes that
developing countries may not have such technical means available. 370 The
Principle recommends that standardizing bodies have processes in place to
make hard copies of information available upon request. 371
2.

Openness

International standardizing body membership should be open to
relevant bodies, at least within WTO members. 372 Note that this Principle does
not apply to some of the non-state actor criteria-setting bodies described here
because they are not international standardizing bodies. The TBT defines an
international body as one whose “membership is open to the relevant bodies of
at least all members.” 373 Of those described here, ISO is an international
standardizing body because it has a membership that is open to all WTO
members. None of the other non-state actors described here operates as an
international standardizing body because their memberships are not open to all
WTO members. International standardizing body members should be able to
participate in every stage of standards development, from early policy
development through adoption. 374
The Principle expressly encourages
developing country participation by stating that standardizing bodies should
provide developing countries with “meaningful” participation opportunities at
all stages of development. 375 And the Principle underscores standardizing
bodies’ adherence to the TBT’s Code of Good Practice, which requires that
participation in international standardization activities takes place through a
single delegation that represents the interests of all relevant standardizing
bodies. 376

369

See id. ¶ 4.
See id. ¶ 5.
371
See id.
372
See id. ¶ 6.
373
See id. at Annex 1, ¶ 6.
374
See id.
375
See id. ¶ 7.
376
See id.
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Impartiality and Consensus

To avoid giving privilege or favor to a specific supplier, country, or
region, the Principle states that all WTO member relevant bodies should
receive “meaningful” opportunities to contribute to all facets of standards
development. 377 Impartiality should be shown throughout the development of
standards, including fees charged for standards and the right to incorporate the
adopted international standard into regional or national standards. 378
4.

Effectiveness and Relevance

To facilitate international trade and prevent unnecessary trade barriers,
international standards “need to be” relevant and “effectively respond” to the
market, regulators, countries’ scientific and technological development. 379
Further, standards “should not distort the global market, have adverse effects
on fair competition, or stifle innovation and technological development.” 380
The standards should not prefer the “characteristics or requirements of specific
countries or regions when different needs or interests exist in other countries or
regions.” 381 And the standards should be “performance based,” not based on
“design or descriptive characteristics.” 382 To achieve effectiveness and
relevance, international standardizing bodies should consider relevant
regulatory or market needs and scientific and technological developments;
provide a process for reviewing obsolete, inappropriate, or ineffective
standards; and develop a process for improving communications with the
WTO. 383
5.

Coherence

The Principle urges international standardizing bodies to avoid
duplicating or overlapping the work of other international standardizing bodies
and encourages international standardizing bodies to cooperate and coordinate
with one another. 384
6.

Development Dimension

The Principle states that standardizing bodies should consider the
constraints that developing countries face in effectively participating in
377

See id. ¶ 9.
See id.
379
See id. ¶ 10.
380
Id.
381
Id.
382
Id.
383
Id. ¶ 11.
384
See id. ¶ 12.
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standards development. 385 Additionally, the Principle encourages international
standardizing bodies to seek “[t]angible ways” to facilitate developing
countries’ involvement. 386 The Principle suggests that providing technical
assistance, in accordance with TBT article 11, may be appropriate. 387
Thus, as to the non-state actor criteria-setting bodies described here,
three levels of WTO law potentially affect the bodies’ standard-setting
practices and the extent to which they must consider developing country
interests. First, the TBT requires WTO members to use reasonable efforts to
ensure that such bodies comply with the TBT Code of Good Practice, even if
the body itself has not accepted the Code. 388 Second, the TBT allows the
bodies to accept its Code of Good Practice. 389 Third, if a body has accepted
the Code of Good Practice, the body must also comply with relevant provisions
of the Standards Development Principles. 390 Attention now turns to whether
these levels of WTO law have created an environment where developing
country interests are integrated into non-state actor standard-setting practices.
C.

Degree of Developing Country Interest Advancement

A review of the non-state actor environmental criteria-setting bodies
described above reveals that non-state actors vary greatly in the consideration
they give to developing countries’ interests when setting criteria. Those that
fail to consider developing country interests likely fail to do so because nonstate actors have no direct legal obligation to consider such interests and few
incentives to do so. Nothing in the WTO regulatory scheme described above
directly obligates non-state actors to consider developing countries’ interests in
their work. Instead, TBT article 4 places the burden on members to use
reasonable measures to ensure that non-state actors comply with the Code of
Good Practice. 391 Relevant Code of Good Practice provisions do not directly
obligate non-state actors to consider developing country interests; instead, the
provisions require non-state actors to treat domestic products that are like
foreign products no less favorably and to avoid creating or applying standards
in a manner that creates unnecessary obstacles to international trade. 392 There
has been no interpretation of the scope of members’ duty to ensure compliance
with the Code of Good Practice provisions. Thus, the members’ duty under
article 4 is vague.
Those standardizing bodies that have accepted the Code of Good
Practice must abide by the Standards Development Principles, which expressly
385

See id. ¶ 13.
See id.
387
See id.
388
See TBT, supra note 32, at art. 4.1.
389
Id. at Annex 3(B).
390
See id. at art. 2, 3, Annex 3; Principles for the Development of International Standards,
supra note 362.
391
See TBT, supra note 32, at art. 4.1.
392
See id. at art. 5.2.1.
386
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include a Development Dimension principle. 393 That principle requires the
bodies to consider developing countries’ interests and ways to involve
developing countries in the bodies’ standard-setting processes. 394 The most
recent list of standardizing bodies that have voluntarily accepted the Code of
Good Practice includes national standardizing bodies from 132 developed and
developing countries. 395 Thus, through the Code of Good Practice and the
Standards Development Principles, those bodies have an obligation under
WTO law to consider developing country interests. Aside from the national
standardizing bodies, however, none of the other non-state actor environmental
criteria-setting bodies described here has accepted the Code of Good
Practice. 396 In fact, out of the 171 bodies that have accepted the Code of Good
Practice, most are national standardizing bodies. 397 Only fifteen out of the 171
appear to be industry-specific or inter-industry non-state actors. 398
Even if a non-state actor chose to accept the TBT Code of Good
Practice and thereby should also comply with relevant Standards Development
Principles, there is no enforcement mechanism associated with the Standards
Development Principles to ensure that a standardizing body is adhering to its
Principles. Thus, unless a member country reins it in, a non-state actor that has
not voluntarily accepted the TBT Code of Good Practice is free to set
environmental criteria for itself and, in the case of a retailer or manufacturer,
its supply chain, without regard for developing country interests.
Indeed, such appears to be the case with the non-state actor firmspecific criteria-setting bodies, such as Walmart, The Home Depot, and
Timberland. None has accepted the TBT Code of Good Practice. Nothing on
their websites or their literature suggests that they take developing country
interests into account or that they consider whether their environmental
marketing claim schemes create trade barriers for developing countries. 399
While BASF has chosen to assist developing countries in its efforts to make
their dye processes more eco-efficient, 400 the matrix it draws upon to set its

393

See Principles for the Development of International Standards, supra note 362, ¶ 13.
See id.
395
See ISO, Standardizing Bodies Having Notified Acceptance of the WTO TBT Code of
Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption, and Application of Standards (Feb. 28, 2011),
available at http://www.standardsinfo.net/info/docs_wto/TbtList_20110228.pdf (last visited
Nov. 05, 2011).
396
See id.
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See id.
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See id. The fifteen include non-state industry-specific actors in Australia, Japan,
Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden.
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See Sustainability Index, supra note 28 (describing Walmart’s sustainability
assessment); Eco Options, supra note 227 (describing The Home Depot’s Eco Options product
line that contributes to energy efficiency, water conservation, healthy homes, clean air, and
sustainable forestry); Green Index Rating, supra note 229.
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eco-efficiency standards does not contemplate developing country interests or
WTO obligations. 401
Absent any legal obligation to do so, ISO has taken a number of steps
to see that developing countries play as full a role as possible in its standardsetting processes. Its membership is open to national standardizing bodies
from developing and developed nations. 402 Its standard-setting process is
transparent, and its voting process favors no member. In addition, as noted
above, ISO has established DEVCO, a policy committee charged with
addressing developing country needs. 403
DEVCO monitors ISO’s
implementation of its Action Plan for Developing Countries, 404 which focuses
on providing technical assistance and capacity building within developing
countries. 405 Critics note that DEVCO’s reach is limited by its funding, which
appears to be donor based. 406 In addition, they point out that developing
countries’ limited resources and ISO’s membership and procedural rules make
it difficult for developing countries to effectively participate in ISO
environmental standard development. 407
Current membership of ISO’s TC 207, the committee charged with
working on environmental management standards, illustrates the level of
involvement of developing countries and whether their collective voices are
heard when standards come up for a vote. 30.6% of the developing countries
worldwide are members of TC 207, whereas 42% of developed countries are
members of TC 207. 408 Of the members participating on TC 207, 60.5% are
developing countries; the remaining countries are developed. 409 Thus, under
ISO voting rules, which require a two-thirds vote of participating TC members

401

See U.N. Indus. Dev. Org. (UNIDO), Eco-Efficiency for SMEs in the Moroccan
Dyeing Industry (2002), available at
http://www.basf.com/group/corporate/en/function/conversions:/publish/content/sustainability/g
lobal-compact/images/Eco-Efficiency_for_SMEs_in_the_Moroccan_Dyeing_Industry.pdf
(explaining a joint effort of UNIDO, BASF, and UNEP to create a sustainable approach to
industrial development).
402
See Who Can Join ISO, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/about/discover-iso_who-can-join-iso.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
403
See What is DEVCO?, supra note 133.
404
See id.
405
See ISO ACTION PLAN, supra note 135.
406
See Islam, supra note 129, at 35 (citation omitted).
407
See id. at 25–26 (quoting UNCTAD, Commodities Division, ISO 14001: International
Environmental Management Systems Standards, Five Key Questions for Developing Country
Officials, Draft for Comments 38 (1996)). The UNCTAD report further states “developing
countries have voted on a standard in which they have had no input, on a standard largely
prepared and developed by corporate experts from industrialized countries.” Id. at 26.
408
See TC 207 Environmental Management, supra note 248; WDI 2011, supra note 19, at
10–13 (breaking down the size of the world’s economy by country).
409
Worldwide, roughly 68% (145 out of 214) of countries are developing countries; 32%
(69 out of 214) are developed. See WDI 2011, supra note 19, at 10–13. Thus, the ratio of
developing to developed countries on TC 207 is similar to the global ratio of developing to
developed counties.
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to send a standard to ISO general membership, 410 to the extent that the
developing country members speak for developing country non-members, the
former have the ability to advance developing country interests on TC 207
environmental management standards.
When a standard reaches a final vote, developing countries represent
61.8% of the 110 member bodies eligible to vote; developed countries
represent the remainder. 411 Here again, when standards reach a final vote,
developing country members have the number of votes needed to advance and
protect their interests. Thus, ISO’s structure, policy committee work, and
general membership and TC 207 membership each provide significant
opportunities for developing countries to involve themselves in ISO work and
protect and advance their interests.
Unlike the specific actions that ISO has taken to involve developing
countries in its standardization process, CGF has made only general statements
that could be interpreted to support developing countries but do not clearly do
so. For example, CGF’s GSCP materials suggest that it seeks to harmonize its
standards with environmental standards, and Levels 1 and 2 of its
Environmental Reference Requirements require firms to satisfy relevant legal
requirements and ensure that their environmental practices are consistent with
international standards. 412
Nothing in the Environmental Reference
Requirements, however, speaks to firms’ compliance with the TBT Code of
Good Practice or the TBT Committee’s Standards Development Principles. 413
Nothing in the materials suggests that firms should provide differential
treatment to developing country exporters, even as the retailers align all of
their suppliers under the same set of environmental practice criteria. 414 If the
criteria are set above developing country capacities, developing country
exporters are effectively boxed out of the retailers’ supply chain. Again, while
the Reference Requirements appear to support harmonization of environmental
practice criteria, 415 nothing in the tool prevents retailers from generating their
own set of standards. This leaves developing country exporters in the difficult
position of attempting to comply with a number of environmental practice
criteria.
In stark contrast to the criteria-setting practices of firm-specific nonstate actors and inter-industry actors like CGF, ISEAL Alliance’s Standard
Setting Code draws upon language from the TBT, the TBT Code of Good
Practice, and the TBT Committee’s Standards Development Principles. 416
ISEAL perceives itself as filling a gap between ISO standards, which offer
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See How ISO Develops Standards, supra note 249.
See TC 207 Environmental Management, supra note 248.
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See Environmental Reference Requirements, supra note 267, at 5.
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See id.
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See id.
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general environmental standards, and those industry-specific organizations,
such as FSC and MSC, that seek to provide specific environmental criteria. 417
As a firm develops its standards, ISEAL requires that the firm consider
stakeholders that would be advantaged by the standard and those that would be
disadvantaged. 418 ISEAL expressly requires that firms consider developing
countries’ interests and seek ways to increase developing country participation
in their standards development process. 419 Additionally, ISEAL requires that
the environmental standards withstand at least one notice and comment
round, 420 providing an opportunity for developing countries to express and
advance their interests. The transparency of ISEAL’s standard development
process ensures that developing countries will, at a minimum, understand how
ISEAL-certified firms generate their environmental criteria. 421 In ISEAL’s
Impacts Code, which allows certifiers to assess whether their schemes are
achieving their objectives, ISEAL again requires that the certifiers expose their
schemes to stakeholder scrutiny, inviting them to comment on whether the
schemes are reaching the firms’ objectives. 422
ISEAL’s Standard Setting and Impacts Codes are models of how a nonstate criteria-setting body can integrate developing country interests into
environmental criteria setting schemes. As noted above, FSC and MSC are
ISEAL members. 423 As such, the degree of the bodies’ consideration of
developing countries interests is high.
Green Business’ standardization and certification schemes are distinct
from the other non-state actor inter-industry criteria-setting bodies described
above on several levels. First, unlike the other inter-industry schemes, Green
Business sets criteria and certifies compliance with those criteria. 424 The
others either do not certify compliance at all, e.g., ISO, or draw upon third
parties to assess whether certification is appropriate, e.g., CGF and ISEAL.
Nothing on the Green Business Network, Green America, or National Green
Pages websites indicates how any of the entities sets environmental criteria or
who plays a role in setting the criteria. 425 The criteria are stated in general
terms, without specifying compliance levels. 426 Nothing suggests that the
entities looked to ISO 14024 to set their criteria for their eco-label, and nothing
suggests that the entities comply with the TBT’s Code of Good Practice, the
TBT Standards Development Principles, or ISEAL’s Good Practice Codes. 427
417
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422
See ISEAL Impacts Code, supra note 286, at 2.
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See GREEN AMERICA, http://www.greenamerica.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2011); GREEN
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Nothing indicates that Green Business factors the concerns of developing
countries into its standard-setting practices or the certification process for its
eco-label. 428 The opaqueness and generalities associated with its schemes
suggests that Green Business and its related entities are largely ignorant of
developing country interests. Without question, this form of standardization
and eco-label certification is most dangerous to developing countries.
The preceding assessment evaluated the extent to which non-state actor
criteria-setting bodies consider developing country interests based on how the
schemes are designed. A review of WTO CTE and TBT Committee meeting
minutes captures the perceptions of developing countries themselves. 429
Examination of these committee reports reveals that in spite of the levels of
WTO regulation noted above and the efforts of entities such as ISO, CGF, and
ISEAL, developing countries routinely complain that non-state actor criteriasetting bodies’ efforts to engage in environmental regulation are creating
obstacles to international trade. 430
WTO members raised concerns regarding non-state actor carbon
footprint schemes, for example, during the CTE committee meeting in
February 2010. 431 The representative from Colombia observed that non-state
actor carbon footprint standards were proliferating and that, generally, the nonstate actor standard development process lacked transparency, which could
result in trade restrictions, especially for SMEs in developing countries. 432
The representative from Argentina further stated that non-state actor standards
were frequently more restrictive than international environmental standards
and that in light of developing countries’ limited financial resources and
technical capacities, the standards could create obstacles to international
trade. 433 The Argentine representative noted that there was considerable
disparity among non-state actor standardizing schemes, especially in how the
schemes defined the scope of life-cycle analysis; 434 the representative also
stated that the proliferation of non-state schemes had the potential to confuse
consumers. 435 The representative from Turkey added that with over 400
environmental labels, developing countries were finding it “challenging and
costly” to meet the range of requirements. 436 The representative from Turkey
also noted that non-state actor carbon footprint schemes had the potential to
become “disguised protectionism.” 437 Representatives from China and Kenya
shared similar concerns. 438
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Developing country members of the WTO CTE raised the issue of nonstate actor environmental standards again at its meeting in September 2010. 439
The Colombian representative stated that large retailers’ environmental
standards “were of particular concern as they could become de facto technical
barriers to trade.” 440 El Salvador’s representative echoed other members’
concerns and stressed the difficulties and costs that SMEs in developing
countries faced due to the lack of harmonization of standards and transparency
in the standards development process. 441
The WTO’s TBT Committee members have raised similar concerns.
At the committee’s June 2009 meeting, in a discussion of standards, India
noted that the proliferation of standards, guides, and recommendations posed a
“serious barrier to international trade,” one that “had a particularly negative
impact on developing country exports.” 442 India pointed out that non-state
actors had created a range of standards that “negatively affected” developing
countries’ access to developed country markets. 443 Representatives from
Mexico, Kenya, Uganda, Egypt, Cuba, Tanzania, China, Pakistan, and
Argentina agreed with India’s concern. 444
Assessment of the non-state actor environmental marketing claim
schemes and developing country responses to those schemes suggest that if the
universe of non-state actors were limited to international organizations such as
ISO or ISEAL, then developing countries would have ample opportunity to
advance and protect their interests as the non-state actors engaged in standardsetting and certification practices. Unfortunately, the universe is not so
limited; instead, it is crowded with non-state actors that have no formal
mechanism in place to recognize and consider developing country interests in
their schemes, resulting in the potential development of environmental
marketing schemes that create trade barriers for developing countries. In
addition, as noted above, standing alone, neither the Code of Good Practice nor
the Standards Development Principles has any enforcement mechanism. 445
Thus, even if a non-state actor agreed to comply with the provisions, its failure
to do so would have no consequences. The next section considers potential
solutions to these problems.
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ASSESSMENT OF SOLUTIONS TO THE TRADE BARRIER PROBLEMS
THAT MAY ARISE FROM NON-STATE ACTOR ENVIRONMENTAL
MARKETING CLAIM STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION SCHEMES

Working from the premise that the existing legal landscape does not
effectively ensure that non-state actors, especially firm and industry-specific
standardizing bodies, will recognize and consider developing country interests
as they set their environmental marketing claim standards or certification
processes, this section summarizes and assesses two solutions to make the
legal landscape more effective. Solutions include: (A) do nothing and allow
the market and existing law to filter out those schemes that do not consider
developing country interests; and (B) modify existing WTO law to require or
incentivize non-state actors to consider developing country interests as they set
and certify compliance with their schemes.
A.

No Changes to the Legal Landscape

Regardless of the fact that developing countries have argued that some
non-state actor criteria-setting bodies’ environmental marketing claim schemes
are creating trade barriers and the schemes themselves appear to give no
deference to developing country interests, there are several reasons why some
would argue that there should be no changes to the current United States or
WTO legal landscape. First, though there may be the potential for trade
barriers to arise, to date, no developing countries have offered any proof that
the purported barriers exist. Second, even if they do exist, the law does not
proscribe all trade barriers, only those that create unnecessary obstacles to
international trade. 446 Non-state actor voluntary schemes designed to protect
the environment may well withstand WTO law scrutiny. Third, even if the
barriers exist and obstruct developing countries’ participation in international
trade, additional national or WTO regulation may not be the most efficient
approach to removing the barriers, especially since the conduct at issue—that
of non-state actors in the global marketplace—is beyond the direct reach of the
WTO and difficult for national governments to regulate. Instead, market
forces alone may be sufficient to free the flow of trade, giving developing
country exporters access to developed country markets.
1.

No Harm, No Foul

Absent a showing of actual boxing out of markets or developing
country claims against developed country importers, some would argue that
there is no need to make any change to the current legal landscape affecting
international environmental marketing claims.
However, those most
vulnerable to harm from schemes that are insensitive to developing country
interests are SMEs within developing countries that have no resources to spend
446
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on making claims before international trade tribunals. Their best hope is to
speak through their national standardizing bodies and WTO representatives,
which they have done. Thus, the absence of any showing of actual harm does
not indicate that there is no issue to be resolved.
2.

Non-State Actor Environmental Marketing Claim
Schemes May Give Rise to Trade Barriers, but the
Barriers Are Necessary and, Thus, Neither Arbitrary
nor Unjustified

Relevant WTO law has been crafted to strike a balance between
members’ efforts to protect their environment and other members’ access to
markets. The GATT and TBT regimes do not proscribe all obstacles to trade;
those that are necessary and are not arbitrary or unjustified are permissible.
Arguably, voluntary non-state actor eco-label schemes are necessary to allow
sellers to inform consumers of their environmentally responsible products. As
long as the non-state actor’s standard-setting and certification processes are
designed to further that goal, they would likely not be considered arbitrary or
unjustified. Thus, should any barrier arise from non-state actor environmental
marketing schemes, the barrier would be a necessary one because it maintains
the balance between some members’ environmental concerns and others’
access to market concerns.
The difficulty with this argument is that the potential exists for the
development of schemes that are far more rigorous than those with which any
developing country could ever hope to comply. For example, the scheme may
require that producers conduct a highly detailed NPR-PPM analysis, but a
developing country SME exporter may lack the technological infrastructure to
collect the data needed for the analysis. Thus, the exporter would not be able
to certify its product, even though the product may have significant
environmental attributes and be comparable to certified products. While the
non-state actor’s scheme may be consistent with WTO law because it is
necessary and not arbitrary or unjustified, 447 it may still result in a significant
trade barrier. And if the developed country non-state actor is a large retailer
with a self-declared product label, a developing country exporter must fit
within the retailer’s label criteria to supply the retailer. Otherwise, the
developing country exporter is left out of the market. Furthermore, with nonstate actors developing a wide range of certification schemes, developing
country exporters are forced to attempt to comply with a number of schemes,
each with its own criteria and certification processes, just to compete. Thus,
while in theory WTO law establishes a balance between environmental
management and access to trade, in practice, the balance is offset. Developing
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country exports, while produced through environmentally sound practices, are
not able to obtain developed country certification. 448
3.

Allow the Market and Existing Regulation to Filter Out
Schemes that Do Not Consider Developing Country
Interests

Through the WTO’s TBT, the TBT Code of Good Practice, and the
TBT’s Standards Development Principles, WTO law currently has the legal
structures in place to require that members take reasonable efforts to ensure
non-state actor environmental marketing claim criteria-setting bodies recognize
and advance developing country interests. Should a member fail to take such
measures, or do so but allow the existence of non-state actor schemes that are
not compliant with WTO law, market pressure may be sufficient to drive the
non-compliant non-state actors from the market. Informed consumers can
demand products that are environmentally responsible yet sensitive to
developing country needs. As demand for such products increases, arguably,
the supply of such products also increases, and the market shifts to
accommodate more suppliers that are environmentally responsible and
sensitive to developing countries and drive out those suppliers that are not.
The emergence and influence of consumer watchdog groups such as
TerraChoice and organizations such as ISEAL illustrate the market’s ability to
regulate itself. By casting a spotlight on non-compliant actors or certifying the
credibility of compliant actors, such groups promote developing country
interests and provide valuable information to consumers. Through their
information campaigns, the organizations spur demand for environmentally
responsible products that do not give rise to trade barriers.
The market characteristics at issue, however, likely render it incapable
of driving from retailers’ shelves environmental marketing claims that are false
or insensitive to developing countries. As noted elsewhere, a consumer’s
product choices involve information costs. Much of the information
consumers need to make informed choices is available on the product’s label,
including price, quantity, and quality.
Some product attributes, however, involve credence costs—those costs
of which the consumer learns, if at all, through his research or post-purchase
use of the product. Information regarding a product’s environmentally
responsible attributes falls into this category because from a product’s label
alone, the consumer cannot know for certain whether the product’s
environmental claims are valid or whether the product’s eco-label incorporates
standardizing and certification procedures that are sensitive to developing
countries. Furthermore, as consumers shop, they purchase many products
bearing eco-labels, many of which are low-priced items. Because of the high
448
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number of eco-labeled products purchased and low prices associated with the
products, there is little incentive for consumers to engage in the kind of
research necessary to verify product claims. Consequently, consumers
themselves are unlikely to affect demand such that it drives from the market
eco-labeled products that are invalid or insensitive to developing countries.
While organizations such as TerraChoice and ISEAL effectively guide some
consumer demand, they are too few and not known well enough to play a
significant role in changing the marketplace. Thus, the market itself is not
likely to drive from retailers’ shelves the products bearing eco-labels that are
insensitive to developing countries.
B.

Modify Existing WTO Law to Ensure that Non-State Actors
Recognize and Consider Developing Country Interests as
They Standardize and Certify Environmental Marketing
Claims

Arguably, two clarifications to the WTO’s TBT are all that are
necessary to draw the non-state actors at issue here into the applicable WTO
legal structures. First, the TBT definition of non-governmental body must be
clarified so that it expressly includes non-state firm-specific, industry-specific,
and inter-industry bodies. Second, the scope of WTO members’ duty to ensure
that standardizing bodies operating within their territories are complying with
applicable TBT provisions must be clarified. As explained more fully below,
the first clarification may arise from TBT committee decisions or through a
competent WTO body decision, arising from a WTO member filing a dispute
against another member, while the second clarification is best left to a
competent WTO body. 449
As its annual compilation of Decisions and Recommendations
illustrates, the TBT Committee is charged with administering the TBT. 450 Its
rules of procedure permit members to submit proposals for committee review
and approval. 451 Should a member seek clarification of the term “nongovernmental body,” the member could propose clarifications to the TBT
Committee and seek consensus on them. 452 The current definition of nongovernmental body reads: “Body other than a central government body or a
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local government body, including a non-governmental body which has legal
power to enforce a technical regulation.” 453
The TBT Committee could add an explanatory note to the definition
which reads:
A non-governmental body includes a body that generates a
standard and is neither a central government body nor a
local government body. Such a body is a recognized body
for the purpose of this Agreement.
Such a note would clarify that a non-governmental body could be a
firm-specific, industry-specific, or inter-industry body that generates a
standard. As noted above, such bodies could accept the TBT Code of Good
Practice and, in so doing, would also have to adhere to the TBT Committee’s
Standards Development Principles, each of which would cause the body to
consider developing country interests as the body conducts its standardization
and certification processes.
Having clarified the definition of non-governmental body, the focus
shifts to bringing the non-governmental actions within the members’ duties
created within the TBT. TBT article 4.1 requires members to take “such
reasonable measures as may be available to them” to ensure that, among other
entities, non-governmental standardizing bodies within their territories accept
and comply with the Code of Good Practice, and by incorporation, the
Standards Development Principles. 454 Here again, “reasonable measures” may
be clarified through an explanatory note. 455 Such a note could provide
examples of measures a member should take to ensure compliance with the
TBT’s Code of Good Practice and Standards Development Principles. For
instance, the note may provide:
A member takes reasonable measures to ensure acceptance
and compliance with the Code of Good Practice and the
Standards Development Principles when it requires or
incentivizes standard-setting entities to certify compliance
with the Code of Good Practice and Standards
Development Principles.
Such a note would permit a range of options for members to take from
prescribing acceptance and compliance to incentivizing acceptance and
compliance.
Prescribing acceptance and compliance would require a
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significant amount of political will and, to be effective, enforcement capacity.
If political will or enforcement capacity is lacking, a member could choose to
incentivize acceptance and compliance with more favorable tax treatment,
speedier certification processes, or other devices designed to nudge
standardization and certification entities toward Code of Good Practice and
Standards Development Principles acceptance and compliance.
Opponents of the clarifications suggested above argue that the WTO
ought not to get involved in regulating non-state actor standardizing and
certification schemes because it is not the most effective body for regulating
such entities. 456 Opponents observe that the WTO members themselves have
not yet clarified the meaning of many environmental standards and that the
WTO forum has not been an effective debate forum. 457 For the WTO to act
before a critical mass of understanding has developed would put the WTO in
the position of dictating intrastate environmental policy on behalf of individual
members. 458 Should the WTO assume such a role, opponents argue that the
credibility and legitimacy of the WTO would be questioned. 459 The WTO is
not, and has never been, an environmental policy setting organization. 460 It
lacks the institutional expertise to discern the best approaches to environmental
problems. 461 Moreover, existing WTO rules and decisions provide sufficient
guidelines for members. 462 Rather than enacting more specific or further
reaching provisions, the WTO should allow individual members and functional
non-state actors to fill the regulatory space with their own environmental
policy. 463 As long as non-state actors respond to circumstances within
developing countries and provide meaningful opportunities for developing
countries to be involved in standard and certification development, the nonstate actors may optimize the benefits of standards and certification schemes to
sustainable development. 464 The U.S. Representative on the WTO CTE
committee has taken a similar position, arguing that the WTO’s Doha mandate
under paragraph 32(i) limits the CTE’s purview to government actions, not
non-state actors. 465
Opponents’ arguments make a critical assumption that, if invalidated,
renders their arguments moot. Opponents argue that existing WTO rules and
decisions provide sufficient guidance to non-state actors and create an
environment where non-state actors, such as ISEAL, are able to flourish and
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generate standardizing and certification schemes that meet or exceed WTO
rules. Admittedly, ISEAL, ISO, and other similar organizations meet or
exceed relevant WTO legal thresholds. However, many non-state actors do
not; they, too, have filled the regulatory space under existing WTO rules.
Organizations such as CGF have a tremendous amount of market power, yet
they do not comply with key provisions in the TBT Code of Good Practice and
Standards Development Principles. As long as such organizations are able to
find suppliers that can satisfy their standards and certification requirements,
they will continue to operate, even if doing so effectively boxes developing
country exporters out of the market.
Moreover, the clarifications noted above do not breach the principle of
“embedded liberalism” 466 at the core of the WTO because they do not put the
WTO in the position of setting environmental policy.
Instead, the
clarifications direct members to ensure that non-state criteria-setting bodies to
adhere to a set of best practices and principles that would have them include
developing country interests in their criteria-setting and certification schemes.
The precise measures that members should take to ensure criteria-setting
bodies’ acceptance and compliance with the Code of Good Practice and the
Standards Development Principles are left to members to work out. Within
those provisions, the extent to which developing country interests drive
criteria-setting bodies’ practices is left for members and criteria-setting bodies
to determine.
Moreover, the clarifications suggested above are consistent with the
WTO’s position on environmental requirements. In its statement entitled
“Environmental Requirements and Market Access:
Preventing ‘Green
Protectionism,’” the WTO notes that the “answer is not to weaken
environmental standards, but to enable exporters to meet them” and
recommends that a balance be struck between protecting market access and the
environment. 467 The clarifications will achieve that balance because they
clarify the role that WTO members must play in protecting market access,
without generating environmental policy. Admittedly, the clarifications may
slow the development of environmental marketing claim schemes because as
non-state actors integrate developing countries and their interests into their
schemes, the standardization and certification processes may become slower.
Additionally, the standards themselves may not be initially as high as they
would have been, had the entities not considered developing countries.
However, by drawing developing countries and their exporters into the
processes, more environmentally responsible developing country exporters will
be able to participate in the market, resulting in a global increase in the supply
466
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of goods produced in an environmentally responsible manner. In turn, greater
benefit to the environment would result. As developing country exporters’
capacities and proficiencies in manufacturing and supplying environmentally
responsible products increase, standards themselves may also increase,
resulting again in an overall net gain to the environment.
CONCLUSION
This Article has surveyed environmental marketing claim criteriasetting bodies to determine the extent to which the bodies consider developing
country interests in their schemes. Finding that most of the current schemes
are the product of non-state bodies and that many such bodies fail to consider
developing country interests in their schemes, the Article has suggested two
clarifications to the WTO’s TBT. These clarifications would make WTO
members responsible for taking reasonable measures to ensure that non-state
actors acting within their territories are integrating developing countries’
interests into their standardization and certification schemes. In doing so, the
clarifications would maintain a balance between safeguarding market access
for developing country exporters and protecting the environment. Such a
balance would result in a general rise in both environmentally responsible firm
conduct and the supply of environmentally responsible products.
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